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INTRODUCTION
1

If Roe v. Wade were overruled,2 could Mary, a citizen of a state that
prohibited abortions (let’s say Utah), be barred from obtaining abortions in a
state (let’s say California) in which abortions were legal? This Article makes
seven points in relation to answering this question. All the observations made
herein are relevant not only to the unlikely event of Roe’s demise, but also to a
nontrivial class of constitutional state laws that can be circumvented if a citizen
can cross his state border and avail himself of his neighboring state’s less
restrictive laws. This class includes restrictions on gambling and assisted
suicide, mandatory motorcycle helmet laws, and laws that fix prices for
agricultural goods.3
The first point is that, contrary to many people’s strong intuitions, states in
our country’s federal union generally do have the power to regulate their
citizens’ out-of-state activities. Indeed, states have been doing so since the
earliest days of the republic. States’ exercise of extraterritorial regulatory
power has been upheld by the Supreme Court and has been recognized by the
Model Penal Code and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations.
Doctrinally, such extraterritorial state powers have been tied to the Tenth
Amendment.4 Extraterritorial regulatory jurisdiction is limited by due
process’s requirement that the state regulation be neither “arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair,”5 but a state’s regulation of its own citizen’s out-of-state
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. This is among the difficult constitutional questions that Professor Fallon convincingly
argues would soon face the Supreme Court in the event Roe v. Wade were overturned. See
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., If Roe Were Overruled: Abortion and the Constitution in a Post-Roe
World, 51 ST. LOUIS. U. L.J. 611 (2007). Like Professor Fallon’s contribution, this Article takes
no position on the question of whether Roe v. Wade should be overruled.
3. For a description of the character of such laws, see infra Part I; see also Mark D. Rosen,
Extraterritoriality and Political Heterogeneity in American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 855,
856–60, 883–86 (2002).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively . . . .”).
5. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981).
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activities to ensure the efficacy of a legitimate state law would satisfy this
standard. This broad extraterritorial state regulatory power has not been
displaced by the line of Dormant Commerce Clause case law that imposes
some limits on extraterritoriality. All these matters are discussed in Part I.
Points two through four are closely related to one another and accordingly
are treated together in Part II. The second point is that although states enjoy
general extraterritorial regulatory powers, particular extraterritorial regulatory
efforts plausibly could run afoul of constitutional limitations concerning
interstate relations that are found in the right to travel, Article IV’s Privileges
and Immunities Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or
Immunities Clause.6 Point three is that Utah’s effort to regulate Mary would
not be precluded under any of these doctrines as they currently are understood
by the United States Supreme Court. Point four is that current doctrine
nevertheless cannot be presumed to be stable because, among other reasons,
there has not been a sustained practice of such state extraterritorial regulations
that has received attention from legislatures, the public, and the courts.
The remaining points (five through seven) are discussed in Part III. Point
five is that answering the doctrinal question of whether Utah can regulate
Mary’s California travels invariably will turn on normative considerations
because, among other reasons, the question is not answered by clear
constitutional text, longstanding tradition, or precedent.
The sixth point clarifies the normative question that is presented by Utah’s
regulatory attempts in relation to Mary. Whether Utah should have such
extraterritorial powers is an exceedingly difficult question that goes to the heart
of the meaning of state citizenship and national citizenship and, ultimately, to
the nature of our country’s federal union:7 Does the “right to travel” and/or
national citizenship entail that Mary have a right to the legal entitlement to
abortion that is enjoyed by Californians while Mary visits the Golden State?
Some have so argued,8 but consider the implications. With regard to those
policies that neither the Constitution nor federal statutory law demands
national uniformity, it is widely recognized that states may take different
regulatory approaches. Not infrequently, however, a state will be unable to
accomplish its constitutionally legitimate policy goals if its citizen can free
herself of her home state’s regulation simply by walking into a state that does
not so regulate. If the regulating state does not have the power to preclude
“travel-evasion” of its legitimate policies, then the extent of the pluralism of
6. Though I speak here of these constitutional principles as playing a structural role in
establishing the nature of interstate relations, I do not mean to suggest that they do not also
establish personal rights.
7. I fully agree with Professor Fallon in this regard. See Fallon, supra note 2, at 632–48;
see Rosen, supra note 3, at 911.
8. See Seth F. Kreimer, Lines in the Sand: The Importance of Borders in American
Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 973, 981–84 (2002).
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state policies possible under our federal union is, as a practical matter, quite
limited with regard to those policies that are vulnerable to travel-evasion. Call
this a regime of “soft” pluralism. By contrast, a federal system in which Utah
can prohibit Mary from obtaining an abortion in California would be a regime
of “hard” pluralism in which states can efficaciously regulate across the entire
range of matters with respect to which federal law does not demand nationwide
uniformity. To be clear, the sixth point does not seek to definitively resolve
the choice between “soft” and “hard” pluralism, but only aims to show that the
choice is a difficult one and that much rides on how the question is resolved.
The seventh point is largely institutional: what societal institutions are to
make the choice between “soft” and “hard” pluralism? Points one and three
together establish that, as a purely descriptive matter, our country presently has
a regime of “hard” pluralism; each state can decide on its own whether it
wishes to extraterritorially regulate its citizens and thereby maximize the
efficacy of their regulations or whether it is content ensuring that its citizens
comply with its regulations only while they are within state borders. Point
seven makes clear that these state-by-state decisions may be legislatively
reversed by Congress (in conjunction with presidential participation by virtue
of presentment). Congress has the power to determine the scope of state
extraterritorial powers under the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s “Effects”
Clause, Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment (in relation to what
qualifies as a privilege or immunity of national citizenship), the Commerce
Clause,9 and possibly Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause.10 Point
seven further argues that Congress (and the President) properly have privileged
roles in answering such questions because they have institutional advantages
vis-B-vis both states and the federal courts in deciding the scope of state
extraterritorial regulatory authority and in thereby determining the nature of
state and federal citizenship and the resulting character of our federal union.
Before proceeding, I would like to flag an important question that this
Article does not explore: how Utah would enforce its extraterritorial regulation
of Mary. Though this is a question that merits serious consideration, space
limitations allow only a few observations here. First, even difficult-to-enforce
regulations can have effects in respect of both norm-creation and behavior.11
Second, there are a variety of options that could be utilized to enforce
9. I explain later in the Article why the Commerce Clause is a less suitable source of
congressional power than the above mentioned sources. See infra Part III.C.2.b.
10. See Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 1468, 1485–88 (2007). For more discussion concerning the Privileges and Immunities
Clause as a source of congressional power, see infra Part III.C.2.b.
11. Cf. Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided?—Some New Answers,
95 CAL. L. REV. 451 (2007) (showing that racially restrictive covenants that were legally
unenforceable nevertheless may have facilitated the creation of racially segregated housing
markets).
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extraterritorial regulations, including disclosure requirements that entail
penalties for misrepresentations, extradition,12 and federal legislation that
aimed to support the state law.13 Third, the degree of enforceability will turn
on the precise subject of extraterritorial regulation. Accordingly, even if
privacy concerns or pragmatics were to preclude some enforcement options in
relation to Mary, these options might be available vis-B-vis an extraterritorial
regulation that seeks to ensure compliance with (for instance) a state law that
sets prices for agricultural products.14 One accordingly should not generalize
from the enforceability of Utah’s (hypothetical) extraterritorial anti-abortion
statute to the enforceability of other extraterritorial regulations.
I. STATES’ BASELINE POWERS TO REGULATE THEIR CITIZENS’ OUT-OF-STATE
CONDUCT (POINT ONE)
A comprehensive analysis of the scope of a state’s powers to regulate its
citizen’s out-of-state activities requires analysis of multiple federal
constitutional principles. Under contemporary doctrine, the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause15 determines the presumptive scope of a
state’s regulatory jurisdiction.16
Other constitutional principles—most
importantly the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Privileges and Immunities

12. The Extradition Clause requires State A to yield person Z within its territory to
extraditing state B even if the activities that Z has been accused of committing would not
constitute a crime in state A. See Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 225 (1987) (reaffirming
the holding of Kentucky v. Dennsion, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1860), which “rejected the
position . . . that the Extradition Clause required only the delivery of fugitives charged with acts
which would be criminal by the law of the asylum State”). For a more expansive consideration of
similar enforcement questions, see Mark D. Rosen, Why The Defense of Marriage Act is Not
(Yet?) Unconstitutional: Lawrence, Full Faith and Credit, and the Many Societal Actors that
Determine What the Constitution Requires, 90 MINN. L. REV. 915, 989–99 (2006).
13. For example, bills that have been passed by both houses of Congress prohibit “taking
minors across State lines in circumvention of [state] laws requiring the involvement of parents in
abortion decisions.” Child Interstate Abortion Notification Act, S. 403, 109th Cong. (2006);
Child Custody Protection Act, S. 403, 109th Cong. (2006); 152 CONG. REC. S8151–88 (daily ed.
July 25, 2006) (providing the version passed in the Senate); 152 CONG. REC. H7412–22 (daily ed.
Sept. 26, 2006) (providing the version passed in the House).
14. For such a law, see Rosen, supra note 3, at 859–60, 930–32.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law . . . .”).
16. To be analytically clear, the Due Process Clause is not the source of state extraterritorial
regulatory power; the Court has understood such powers to be an incident of state sovereignty
that has been retained under the Tenth Amendment, see Rosen, supra note 3, at 865–66
(analyzing relevant case law), and the Due Process Clause instead provides the (initial) limit on
such state powers. Nevertheless, courts frequently conflate these distinct analytical steps and
speak of the scope of state regulatory authority as being determined by the Due Process Clause.
For ease of exposition, the discussion that follows above in text will utilize the common parlance.
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Clause,17 the Privileges or Immunities Clause,18 and the right to travel—
impose discrete but important limitations on states’ extraterritorial regulatory
powers.
This Part I shows that, notwithstanding some eloquent arguments to the
contrary,19 states have extensive presumptive powers to regulate their citizens’
out-of-state activities under contemporary Due Process doctrine, and that this
conclusion is not undermined by dicta in some Dormant Commerce Clause
cases that speak about limitations on state extraterritorial powers. Parts II and
III more closely examine limits on such extraterritorial powers that may be
imposed by the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, and the right to travel.
A.

Due Process

To be clear, the only question this Article explores is the extent of a state’s
power to regulate its own citizen’s efforts to opt out of its laws via travelevasion; it does not address the scope of state A’s regulatory powers over the
activities of a citizen of state B that occur in State B. A few of the cases
discussed below nonetheless address state A’s regulatory powers over citizen
B’s conduct in state B. Why? I imagine that almost everyone would agree that
Utah has a greater claim to regulate its own citizen’s conduct in California than
to regulate the conduct of a California citizen in California. For this reason,
appreciating that the Constitution does not flatly foreclose even the latter
regulatory effort is relevant to understanding the scope of state A’s regulatory
powers over its own citizens’ extra-state activities.
Under contemporary constitutional law, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause is the primary determinant of the presumptive scope of a state’s

17. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”).
19. Professor Kreimer first advanced the argument that states lacked the power to regulate its
citizens’ extraterritorial activities in two articles in the early 1990s. See Seth F. Kreimer, “But
Whoever Treasures Freedom . . .”: The Right to Travel and Extraterritorial Abortions, 91 MICH.
L. REV. 907 (1993) [hereinafter Kreimer, “But Whoever Treasures Freedom . . .”]; Seth F.
Kreimer, The Law of Choice and Choice of Law: Abortion, the Right to Travel, and
Extraterritorial Regulation in American Federalism, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 451 (1992) [hereinafter
Kreimer, The Law of Choice and Choice of Law]. I took issue with Professor Kreimer’s
arguments (and those of several other fine academics) in an article a decade later. See Rosen,
supra note 3. Professor Kreimer authored a nearly fifty-page response that appeared in the same
issue of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, with respect to which the Law Review’s
publishing constraints allowed me only a footnote to reply. See Kreimer, supra note 8; Rosen,
supra note 3, at 862 & n.28. Here I provide a fuller answer, in turn, to Professor Kreimer’s
response.
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regulatory jurisdiction.20 Though perhaps surprising to many, the United
States Supreme Court long has upheld the power of states to regulate activities
that occur outside their borders.21 In the 1911 case of Strassheim v. Daily, for
example, the Court permitted Michigan to prosecute a person who was not a
citizen of Michigan for acts he undertook while he was in Illinois to defraud
the state of Michigan.22 Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes wrote that
“[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing
detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm
as if he had been present at the effect.”23 Thirty years later, in Skiriotes v.
Florida, the Court upheld the application of a Florida statute prohibiting
sponge fishing to a Florida citizen’s activities that occurred wholly outside of
Florida’s territorial waters.24 The Skiriotes Court analogized Florida’s
extraterritorial regulatory powers to the unquestioned power of the federal
government to regulate United States citizens when they are “upon the high
seas or even in foreign countries”25 and adverted to the Tenth Amendment as
the source of similar state extraterritorial powers.26
These Supreme Court cases in effect endorsed extraterritorial powers that
had been exercised by states since the beginning of our nation’s history. For
example, a Virginia statute enacted in 1792 criminalized “all felonies
committed by citizen against citizen in any such place.”27 In 1819, the General
Court of Virginia held that this statute supported the Virginia Attorney
General’s prosecution of a Virginia citizen for having stolen a horse in the
District of Columbia that belonged to a fellow citizen of Virginia.28
20. It is far from obvious that a constitutional provision primarily geared toward protecting
individual rights is the appropriate place from which the structural question of the scope of states’
legislative jurisdiction is to be derived. Cf. James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins
of Judicial Jurisdiction: Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169 (2004) (arguing
that state adjudicatory jurisdiction is more properly derived from the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
not the Due Process Clause). I plan to turn my attention to this question in the future. For present
purposes, however, I’m interested only in engaging in positive analysis.
21. For a fuller discussion of these and other cases, see Rosen, supra note 3, at 871–91.
22. 221 U.S. 280, 281–82 (1911).
23. Id. at 285.
24. 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
25. Id. at 73.
26. Id. at 77.
27. Commonwealth v. Gaines, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 172, 173 (1819) (quoting Act 1. Rev.
Code, 1792, ch. 136, § 7).
28. See id. Interestingly, the Virginia court’s decision contained an important choice-of-law
holding: what qualified as a “felon[y]” was to be determined by Virginia law, not the law of the
place where the activity occurred. See id. at 181. The dissenters in the case acknowledged that
“it is competent for a State to legislate rules of conduct for its citizens while resident beyond its
territorial limits,” but did not believe that the Virginia legislature had intended to create such an
extraterritorial regulation. Id. at 183 (Holmes, J., dissenting). The Virginia legislature modified
the statute in 1819 to make clear that it did not intend to extend extraterritorial jurisdiction. See
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Nineteenth century Texas law provided that “persons out of the State may
commit and be liable to indictment and conviction for committing any of the
offenses enumerated in this chapter which do not in their commission
necessarily require a personal presence in this State . . . .”29 Interpreting this
law, an 1882 Texas decision upheld the application of Texas’ criminal law to
an act of forgery of a land certificate for Texas property even though all the
criminal acts had occurred in the State of Louisiana.30 The court further
observed that Texas criminal law could be applied even if the defendants’ acts
were “no crime against the State in which it [was] perpetrated.”31 A 1915
Delaware law criminalized a married citizen’s second marriage in another state
if the first marriage had not been dissolved,32 which was applied to a Delaware
husband who married a second woman in Florida and then returned to his first
wife in Delaware, never thereafter communicating with the second woman.33
An 1891 statute in West Virginia provided that:
if a person be stricken or poisoned out of this state, and die by reason thereof
within this state, the offender shall be as guilty, and may be prosecuted and
punished, as if the mortal stroke had been given, or poison administered, in the
34
county in which the person so stricken or poisoned may so die.

These statutes and cases thus absolutely refute the claim that has been put forth
by one scholar that “the understanding of the scope of the sovereign power of
states before the middle of the twentieth century did not include the right to
regulate citizens extraterritorially.”35
Relying on Strassheim, Skiriotes, and on longstanding state practices,
scholarly restatements of the law reflect the understanding that States have
presumptive extraterritorial power to criminally and civilly regulate their
citizens’ out-of-state conduct. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law provides that States “may apply at least some laws to a person outside
[State] territory on the basis that he is a citizen, resident or domiciliary of the
id. at 182. Professor Fallon’s contribution to this symposium brought the Gaines case to my
attention. See Fallon, supra note 2, at 631 n.85.
29. Hanks v. State, 13 Tex. Ct. App. 289, 305 (Ct. App. 1882) (quoting Tex. Cr. Code, art.
454).
30. Id. at 305, 308–09.
31. Id. at 309.
32. See State v. Bacon, 112 A. 682, 682 (Del. 1920) (“If any inhabitant of this state shall go
out of the state and contract a marriage contrary to this section, with intention to return and reside
in this state, and shall return accordingly, such person, notwithstanding such marriage shall be
solemnized, or contracted, out of this state, shall be liable to be indicted, tried, convicted and
punished in the same manner as if the said marriage had been solemnized, or contracted, within
this state.” (quoting Del. Rev. Code 1915, §4785, par. 2)).
33. See id. at 682.
34. Ex parte McNeely, 14 S.E. 436, 436 (W. Va. 1892) (quoting W. Va. Code 1891, c. 144,
§6).
35. Kreimer, supra note 8, at 978.
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State.”36 The Restatement asserts that this principle applies to both
extraterritorial criminal and civil legislative powers.37 Directed to the criminal
context, the Model Penal Code provides that State A may impose liability if
“the offense is based on a statute of this State that expressly prohibits conduct
outside the State . . . .”38 Indeed, the Model Penal Code affirms that State A
has extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction even if the activity it prohibits occurs
in a State in which the activity is permissible.39 The major limitation identified
by the Model Penal Code is that the regulated conduct must “bear[] a
reasonable relation to a legitimate interest of [the regulating] State . . . .”40 The
Comment states that the “reasonable relation to a legitimate interest”
requirement “expresses the general principle of the fourteenth amendment
limitation on state legislative jurisdiction.”41
The constitutional limitation on state regulatory jurisdiction noted in the
Model Penal Code’s Comment has been grounded by the Court in the Due
Process Clause.42 Case law requires that there be “a significant contact . . .
creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair.”43 As I have shown elsewhere, citizenship on its own
has virtually sufficed to give the home state sufficient interest to regulate its
citizens’ out-of-state activities for purposes of the Due Process Clause.44 This
is sensible insofar as a “state has an enduring contact with its citizen and an
interest in their well-being.”45 Though I agree with Professor Fallon that no
cases “say[] . . . that the citizenship or residence of one of the parties is
necessarily sufficient to justify a state in applying its law to an out-of-state
occurrence,”46 it would seem that a state’s additional interest in regulating to
ensure that its citizen not undermine legitimate state policies would qualify as
any additional “plus” beyond mere citizenship that would justify state
extraterritorial regulation. This conclusion would appear to follow from the

36. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 n.5 (1987).
37. The Restatement is explicit about this. See id. § 403 cmt. f (“The principles governing
jurisdiction to prescribe set forth in § 402 and in this section apply to criminal as well as to civil
regulation.”).
38. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03(1)(f) (1962).
39. Id. § 1.03(2).
40. Id. § 1.03(1)(f).
41. See id. § 1.03 cmt. 6. The Comment, however, neglects to consider other constitutional
limitations that bear on the constitutionality of a state’s extraterritorial regulation. See Rosen,
supra note 3, at 870 & n.59.
42. For some doubts as to whether the Due Process Clause is the most appropriate
constitutional provision to ground such structural limitations on state power, see supra note 20.
43. Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981)).
44. See Rosen, supra note 3, at 871–76.
45. Fallon, supra note 2, at 630.
46. Id. at 630 n.80 (emphasis added).
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case law that upholds extraterritorial state regulatory powers in relation to noncitizens: such powers understandably are more limited than the state’s powers
vis-B-vis its own citizens, yet case law has permitted states to regulate the
extraterritorial activities of non-citizens that are purposefully directed at
undermining legitimate state interests (as in the Supreme Court case of
Strassheim and the Texas case of Hanks v. State, both discussed above).47
The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.48
confirms that states have a legitimate interest in their citizens’ out-of-state
activities if such activities undermine legitimate state policy. That case upheld
a federal statute that prohibited the radio broadcast of lottery advertising by
radio licensees located in nonlottery states.49 The broadcaster in Edge was
located in North Carolina, a nonlottery state, but wanted to broadcast Virginia
lottery advertisements.50 As part of its First Amendment analysis, the Edge
Court concluded that the statute directly advanced the federal government’s
interest of “support[ing] the antigambling policy of a State like North Carolina
by forbidding stations in such a State [from] air[ing] lottery advertising.”51 If
North Carolina already forbade lotteries in North Carolina, in what respect did
the federal statute “support” North Carolina’s anti-gambling policy? The
answer is that Congress and the Court understood that North Carolina’s antigambling policy would have been undermined had the broadcaster been
permitted to broadcast advertisements for an activity that was legal in another
state but prohibited in North Carolina.
Stated differently, the Court understood that North Carolina’s antigambling policy would have been undermined by a North Carolina citizen’s
out-of-state conduct, even if the gambling occurred in a state in which the
activity were legal.52 This makes sense. An anti-lottery policy might be based
on a conclusion that “lotteries play on the hopes of those least able to afford to
purchase lottery tickets, and that its citizens would be better served by
spending their money on more promising investments,”53 and “these objectives
would be undermined regardless of where gambling occurs.”54 In short, since
Edge held that the federal government has a legitimate interest in supporting
North Carolina’s policy concerning North Carolina citizens’ out-of-state

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See supra text accompanying notes 19–20, 25–26.
509 U.S. 418 (1993).
Id. at 421, 425.
Id. at 423–24.
Id. at 428.
For further discussion, see Rosen, supra note 3, at 879 & n.106.
Edge, 509 U.S. at 440 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Rosen, supra note 3, at 880. For further discussion, see id. at 880 & n.108.
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gambling, it follows that North Carolina’s underlying policy of concerning
itself with its citizens’ out-of-state activities is itself legitimate.55
Professor Fallon appears to be of the view that the strongest due processbased argument against extraterritorial state regulatory authority comes from
language in the 1975 opinion of Bigelow v. Virginia56 to the effect that
Virginia could not “prevent its residents from traveling to New York to obtain
[abortion] services or, as the State conceded, prosecute them for going there.
Virginia possessed no authority to regulate the services provided in New
York . . . .”57 Though I agree that this is the strongest argument that can be
made, I do not think it to be particularly robust. First, the language from
Bigelow was dicta,58 as Professor Fallon apparently agrees.59 Second, in

55. The analysis of Edge provided above is fully consistent with the analysis I provided in an
earlier article. See id. at 879–80. Professor Kreimer’s criticism of my analysis of Edge attributes
positions to me that I do not hold. The point of my analysis of Edge is that the case confirms that
states may have a legitimate interest for purposes of due process in their citizens’ out-of-state
activities—a point that Professor Kreimer now concedes. See Kreimer, supra note 8, at 990
(“North Carolina itself has an ‘interest’ sufficient to seek to prohibit gambling on its own territory
and to seek to dissuade its residents from gambling in neighboring Virginia . . . .”). I at no point
suggested that Edge’s analysis—which concerns First Amendment limits on Congress—on its
own establishes that “North Carolina [has] authority to prosecute its residents for disregarding its
norms within a sister state . . . .” Id. at 991. I simply argued that if the Court concluded that a
federal policy of supporting state policy “X” is legitimate, then it is fair to conclude that the Court
believed that state policy “X” itself was legitimate. Here state policy “X” was concern with its
citizens’ out-of-state activities, and the conclusion that this constitutes a legitimate policy is
relevant to the due process inquiry that determines the scope of state regulatory jurisdiction. See
Rosen, supra note 3, at 879–80. For this reason, I believe that Professor Kreimer is wrong to
assert that Edge’s analysis “does not implicate the question of whether North Carolina itself may
prosecute its citizens for playing the Virginia lottery.” Kreimer, supra note 8, at 990.
Finally, Professor Kreimer takes me to task for arguing that the Edge Court’s conclusion
that the federal interest was “derivative” of the state interest overlooks the fact that the federal
government has “separate and distinct” powers from the states on account of the fact that
“Congress’s regulatory authority, unlike that of the states, extends to the entire country.” Id. at
990. I am well aware of the important institutional differences between the federal and state
governments—indeed, I have written at length on this subject. See, e.g., Mark D. Rosen,
Institutional Context in Constitutional Law: A Critical Examination of Term Limits, Judicial
Campaign Codes, and Anti-Pornography Ordinances, 21 J.L. & POL. 223 (2005) [hereinafter
Rosen, Institutional Context]; Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring
Constitutional Principles, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1520–23 (2005). I accordingly was not
suggesting that states enjoy the same regulatory powers that Congress has, but simply meant that
the Court’s finding of a legitimate federal interest in supporting North Carolina’s policy must
have followed from an antecedent conclusion that the North Carolina policy itself was legitimate.
See Rosen, supra note 3, at 879. This is all I intended to signify by the term “derivative.”
56. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
57. Id. at 822–24 (citations omitted). I conclude that this is Professor Fallon’s view on the
basis of his discussion at Fallon, supra note 2, at 628–29.
58. To my mind, Professor Donald Regan has convincingly argued that this language from
Bigelow is dicta. See Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
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Professor Fallon’s words, Bigelow’s “categorical claim that states may never
enact or enforce extraterritorial criminal legislation seems too strong.”60 After
all, Bigelow’s categorical claim, if taken seriously, would have overturned the
longstanding Supreme Court precedent and state practice discussed above and
declared various provisions of scholarly restatements and model codes
unconstitutional without so much as even mentioning those cases, practices,
and materials. Third, post-Bigelow case law has limited Bigelow’s dictum.61
America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85
MICH. L. REV. 1865, 1907–08 (1987). Professor Kreimer countered that “[c]haracterizing the
Bigelow principle as dictum is a dubious move” for three reasons. Kreimer, The Law of Choice
and Choice of Law, supra note 19, at 459 & n.27 (1992). I responded to Professor Kreimer’s
argument, see Rosen, supra note 3, at 891–96, and he to mine, see Kreimer, supra note 8, at 988–
89. The core dispute between my position and Professor Kreimer’s, it seems to me, is semantic:
does reasoning that is (1) unnecessary to the Court’s disposition, (2) contrary to longstanding
practice and multiple Supreme Court precedents, and (3) propounded without even mentioning
these longstanding practices and precedents, much less considering how the new reasoning relates
to such practices and precedents, constitute dicta? Such reasoning, it seems to me, is dicta. If
Professor Kreimer prefers to characterize my argument as a suggestion that Bigelow’s “holding”
has been “narrowed” by subsequent cases I will not protest too loudly, as the line between
discarding dicta and narrowing an earlier holding can be gossamer. The more important point for
present purposes is the following: for the reasons discussed above in the text, Bigelow’s
categorical assertion that states lack extraterritorial regulatory authority should not be understood
to have effect today, if indeed it ever did.
59. See Fallon, supra note 2, at 629 & n.75.
60. Id. at 629.
61. See Rosen, supra note 3, at 893–96 (discussing United States v. Edge, 509 U.S. 418
(1993) and Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986)).
I showed in an earlier article that Posadas explicitly limited Bigelow. The Posadas Court
explained that Virginia’s advertising regulations in Bigelow were unconstitutional only because
the “underlying conduct that was the subject of the advertising restrictions [abortion] was
constitutionally protected and could not have been prohibited by the State.” Id. at 895 (quoting
Posadas, 478 U.S. at 345–46). This means that State A has a presumptive power to restrict
advertisements for out-of-state activities that State A could ban. Professor Kreimer’s near fiftypage response to my article did not respond to this argument. See generally Kreimer, supra note
8. The Edge decision, discussed above, confirms that State A may have an interest in activities
undertaken by its citizens in State B. See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text.
The principle from Edge that State A has a legitimate interest in its citizens’ out-of-state
activities has not been undermined by the case of Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n v.
United States (GNOBA). 527 U.S. 173 (1999). Referring to GNOBA, Professor Kreimer writes
that “[w]hen the Supreme Court finally addressed federal efforts to shore up local moralisms
extraterritorially by preventing broadcasters in states where gambling was legal from conveying
information to listeners in states where gambling was illegal, it invalidated them. This is not a
strong line of authority for extraterritorial moralism.” Kreimer, supra note 8, at 991–92. There
are two problems with Professor Kreimer’s argument. First, this is a misleading description of
the case, for the GNOBA Court took pains to note that federal efforts failed only because the
operation of the statute at issue “and its attendant regulatory regime is so pierced by exemptions
and inconsistencies that the Government cannot hope to exonerate it.” GNOBA, 527 U.S. at 190;
see also id. at 195 (“Had the Federal Government adopted a more coherent policy . . . this might
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Although two recent cases have quoted the Bigelow dictum in the course of
lengthy string cites, the reference has been for the purpose of establishing the
very different (and virtually noncontroversial) principle that State A “does not
have the power . . . to punish [a defendant] for conduct that was lawful where it
occurred and that had no impact on [State A] or its residents.”62 That
principle clearly has no bearing whatsoever on the question of whether State A
has the power to regulate its own citizens’ out-of-state conduct for the purpose
of ensuring that its legitimate policies not be undermined.
To quickly conclude, states have a legitimate interest in their citizens’ outof-state activities to support the conclusion that states have presumptive
extraterritorial regulatory authority under the Due Process Clause, Bigelow
notwithstanding.63
be a different case.”). GNOBA accordingly teaches nothing about the scope of a state’s
extraterritorial authority, but only establishes that an inconsistent federal approach to supporting
state policies will not satisfy First Amendment scrutiny. Second, Professor Kreimer’s argument
that Edge and GNOBA “is not a strong line of authority for extraterritorial moralism” is a straw
man: if these two were the only cases concerning state extraterritorial power Professor Kreimer
would have a point, but a proper analysis of state extraterritorial powers would not begin with
case law dating from the 1990s. Rather, the “line of authority” extends back into the nineteenth
century, and when the modern decisions of Edge and GNOBA are considered in conjunction with
longstanding practice, the Supreme Court decisions of Skiriotes and Strassheim, and scholarly
restatements and model codes, the basis for state extraterritorial regulatory power is quite strong
indeed.
62. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572–73 (1996) (emphasis added); see also
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 421–22 (2003) (holding that in
assessing punitive damages a jury cannot take account of a defendant’s out-of-state conduct that
was “lawful where it occurred and that had no impact on [the State] or its residents”) (quoting
Gore, 517 U.S. at 572–73). With the exception of the Bigelow dictum, the other cases to which
the Court cites in both Gore and State Farm are very old cases from the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries that reflect a widespread understanding of that era that governmental powers
did not extend beyond a polity’s physical border. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 421–22; Gore, 517
U.S. at 571–72. A work-in-progress documents that this “territorialist” view that physical borders
demarcate the end-point of a government’s powers was never given categorical effect, shows the
larger conceptual apparatus of which this “territorialist” view was a part and that it as well as
territorialism was eclipsed in the mid-twentieth century across multiple doctrines, and explains
why the contemporary understanding is superior.
See Mark D. Rosen, Overlapping
Governmental Powers (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Quotations from these older
cases that appear in string cites in both the Gore and Campbell decisions employ a rhetoric that
reflects the older “territorialist” perspective that is inconsistent with the practices, case law, and
scholarly restatements that this Section A has examined at some length. I hope that my work-inprogress will definitively resolve the tension that exists in the case law as regards the significance
of physical borders by once and for all discrediting (or, at the least, severely limiting) the older
cases.
63. In Lines in the Sand: The Importance of Borders in American Federalism, Professor
Kreimer recites a “series of cases” he had discussed in two of his articles with which he says I had
“decline[d] to come to grips” in my piece on extraterritorial state powers. Kreimer, supra note 8,
at 993 n.77. My extraterritoriality article had responded to what I judged to have been Professor
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Dormant Commerce Clause

Professor Fallon concludes that “[a]mong the most serious challenges to
the constitutionality of states’ efforts to stop their citizens from obtaining outof-state abortions would involve the Dormant Commerce Clause”64 on account
Kreimer’s strongest arguments. The cases he takes me to task for ignoring offer little support for
his position, but since he has referenced them once again let me briefly explain why they do not
support his position. It is true that the Court in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962),
reh’g denied, 371 U.S. 905 (1965), “took as given the constraint that California could punish
legitimately only for the actual use of narcotics ‘within the state,’” Kreimer, supra note 8, at 993
n.77, but that is not because the Court assumed that California could not regulate
extraterritorially. Rather, the Supreme Court assumed as it did because the “instructions of the
trial court, implicitly approved on appeal, amounted to ‘a ruling on a question of state law that is
as binding on us as though the precise words had been written’ into the statute,” and the lower
court instructions permitted conviction only upon a showing that the defendant “did use a narcotic
in Los Angeles County, or that while in the City of Los Angeles he was addicted to the use of
narcotics.” Robinson, 370 U.S. at 663, 666.
All the other cases Professor Kreimer cites are tax cases that are consistent with the
position I espouse. I shall treat only the most recent case he cites, Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director,
Division of Taxation. 504 U.S. 768 (1992). If anything, Allied-Signal supports rather than
undermines the approach to due process this Article embraces. The case stands for two
propositions: that (1) a single business can be taxed by multiple states, but that (2) each state’s
taxation is limited to the extent that “there be ‘some definite link, some minimum connection,
between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax.’” Id. at 777 (quoting Miller
Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344–45 (1954)). Similarly, my claim is that (1) more than
one state (home and visitor) can simultaneously regulate a person, but that (2) the home state has
extraterritorial regulatory power only when the out-of-state activity has a definite link to the home
state (i.e., as when the activity can circumvent the home state’s legitimate policy). Those out-ofstate activities that can undermine the legitimate state policy thus constitute the constitutional
predicate for extraterritorial regulation, and this seems to be fully consistent with the tax cases’
principle that “there must be a connection to the activity itself, rather than a connection only to
the actor the State seeks to tax.” Id. at 778.
Indeed, the tax cases explicitly reject any strict territoriality notion that the state can tax
only those monies that arise from in-state transactions or in-state assets. Rather, the “unitary
business principle” that the Court adopts permits a state to tax a share of the business that is
carried on in other states. See id. (explaining that the unitary business doctrine grew from state
efforts to tax railroad and telegraph companies, during which time it became apparent that “what
makes such a business valuable is the enterprise as a whole, rather than the track or wires that
happen to be located within a State’s borders”). To be sure, states can only tax those monies that
are “apportionable” to the state, but what is pertinent to the discussion at hand is that the unitary
business principle rejects apportionment on the basis of “geographical . . . accounting.” Id. at
778, 783. Similarly, I argue that home states’ regulatory powers are not exclusively determined
by physical location but are a function of the fact that a citizen’s out-of-state activities that
undermine legitimate policies of her home state are reasonably apportionable (so to speak) to the
home state. I do not mean to push the analogy too far, for tax laws are sui generis in many
respects, but certainly the tax law to which Professor Kreimer cites does not undermine the
principles developed above in text that the Due Process Clause does not prohibit states from
regulating their citizens’ extraterritorial activities.
64. Fallon, supra note 2, at 636.
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of language from several cases that would appear to bar state regulations of
out-of-state commerce. In one case, for instance, the Court stated that “the
‘Commerce Clause . . . precludes the application of a state statute to commerce
that take place wholly outside of the State’s borders, whether or not the
commerce has effects within the State.’”65
Some comments are in order here, much of which I am quite certain
Professor Fallon would agree with. To begin, even if categorical effect were to
be given to such anti-extraterritorial statements, states would not be
categorically prohibited from seeking to extraterritorially regulate their
citizens. This is because Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine provides only
default baseline rules, which may be altered by Congress.66 States accordingly
would be free to seek federal legislation that permitted the state extraterritorial
regulation that Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine proscribed. Congress
would have the power to do so because, by definition, any state regulatory
matters that could be precluded on account of the Dormant Commerce Clause
could be congressionally permitted under Congress’s Commerce Clause
powers.67 I am certain Professor Fallon would not disagree.
Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, there are strong reasons to doubt
that the Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause anti-extraterritoriality statements
are best read as categorical proscriptions on state powers to regulate commerce
that occurs outside the state’s borders.68 Dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence utilizes two different sorts of legal tests—a virtual per se rule of
illegality for protectionist regulations and a far more deferential balancing test
for nondiscriminatory regulations that incidentally burden interstate
commerce—and the cases in which the Court has propounded its categorical
condemnations of state extraterritorial regulations have involved state laws that

65. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S.
624, 642–43 (1982)).
66. See, e.g., Hillside Dairy Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59, 66 (2003); Metzger, supra note 10,
at 1481.
67. Indeed, Congress also has the power to determine the scope of state regulatory authority
in respect of matters that fall outside of Congress’s Commerce Clause power. See infra Parts II,
III. In light of Congress’s power to legislatively overturn the Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, I chafe at Professor Fallon’s terminology that the Court’s Dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence poses “the most serious challenges to the constitutionality” of state
extraterritorial powers. Fallon, supra note 2, at 636 (emphasis added). Although courts and
commentators regularly refer to Dormant Commerce Clause constraints as constitutional
limitations, Dormant Commerce Clause limitations are better conceptualized as federal common
law rather than constitutional determinations on account of Congress’s power to revise the
Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. See Rosen, supra note 11.
68. See Rosen, supra note 3, at 919–30.
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were clearly protectionist.69 Accordingly, a plausible positive case can be
made that the Court’s proscriptions against extraterritorial regulation are
properly limited to protectionist statutes, and that non-protectionist state
regulations that extraterritorially regulate a state’s citizens are properly
analyzed under the more lenient balancing test that invalidates only those state
regulations that impose burdens on commerce that are clearly excessive in
relation to the putative benefits.70
Limiting the Court’s anti-extraterritorial statements in this fashion is
sensible for several reasons. First, categorically disallowing state power to
regulate out-of-state transactions would be inconsistent with longstanding
practice and precedents. In Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp.71
for example, the Court upheld the application of a Louisiana law that
disregarded a contractual provision that had been entered into by two foreign
corporations outside of Louisiana despite the fact that the provision was
consistent with the law where the contract had been formed.72 The Watson

69. See id. at 922–26. Professor Fallon appears to agree. See Fallon, supra note 2, at 638.
Professor Kreimer has been unable to find any case law to the contrary. See Kreimer, supra note
8, at 995–96.
70. Known as “Pike balancing,” this test comes from the case Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
71. 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
72. The plaintiff, a Louisiana resident, was injured in Louisiana while using a hair-waving
product that had been produced by the Toni Company of Illinois, a subsidiary of a Massachusetts
corporation. Id. at 67. The manufacturer had entered into an insurance contract with the
defendant in the case, a non-Louisiana corporation. Id. The insurance contract had been
negotiated and issued in Massachusetts and had been delivered both to the Toni Company in
Illinois and to the parent company in Massachusetts. Id. The contract contained a “no action”
clause, which “prohibit[ed] direct actions against the insurance company” until there had been a
final determination of the insured’s liability to pay personal injury damages. Id. at 67–68.
Although “no action” clauses were recognized as binding and legal in Massachusetts and
Illinois, Louisiana’s “direct action” statute proscribed them. Id. at 68. The plaintiff in Watson
directly sued the insurance company before having obtained a final judgment or settlement
against the Toni Company, and the insurance company moved to dismiss in reliance on the “no
action” clause. Id. In the Supreme Court, the insurance company argued that “because the policy
was bought, issued and delivered outside of Louisiana,” that state was “without power to exercise
‘extraterritorial jurisdiction,’ that is, to regulate and control activities wholly beyond its
boundaries.” Id. at 71. The Court rejected this argument, ruling that Louisiana could apply its
statute to an insurance contract between a non-Louisiana insurance company and a non-Louisiana
insured that had been negotiated, made, and delivered outside of Louisiana. Id. at 73. Louisiana
was justified in applying its statute to the out-of-state contract, the Watson Court held, because
“Louisiana’s direct action statute is not a mere intermeddling in affairs beyond her boundaries
which are no concern of hers. Persons injured or killed in Louisiana are most likely to be
Louisiana residents, and even if not, Louisiana may have to care for them.” Id. at 72. For these
reasons, the Court held that Louisiana had “legitimate interest in safeguarding the rights of
persons injured.” Id. at 72–73. Application of Louisiana regulations to a non-Louisiana
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case thus upheld Louisiana’s regulation of an out-of-state contract, and the
Supreme Court’s most recent Due Process jurisprudence approvingly referred
to the Watson decision.73 Yet the Watson decision, and many others,74 would
be imperiled if the categorical anti-extraterritoriality statements found in the
Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence were taken at face value.
Second, notwithstanding the Court’s abovementioned observations in its
Dormant Commerce Clause cases, “[s]tate regulations are routinely upheld
despite what is obviously a significant impact on outside actors.”75 Consider,
for example, products liability actions against out-of-state manufacturers and
nuisance actions against polluters across the border.76 In short, to date the
Court has not applied its anti-extraterritoriality principle to reach the many
non-protectionist state regulations that impose effects on out-of-state
commerce.
Third, giving broad application to the Court’s anti-extraterritoriality
statements would be an unwelcome throwback to an earlier jurisprudential era
that has wisely been eclipsed. Contemporary law is to be praised for moving
away from the earlier effort to localize transactions and occurrences as having
“happened” in one place such that only one state had regulatory jurisdiction.77
The new understanding is that “a set of facts giving rise to a lawsuit, or a
particular issue within a lawsuit, may justify, in constitutional terms,
application of the law of more than one jurisdiction.”78 This modern approach
is advisable on account of the many factors79 that frequently conspire to create
circumstances where several states have real interests in the same matter,
interests that undermine the logic of seeking to identify a single place where a
insurance company did not raise due process concerns because the company was certified to do
business in Louisiana. See id. at 68–69 & n.5.
73. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 & n.17 (1981) (holding that states may
apply their law consistently with the requirements of due process and full faith and credit when
the state has sufficient interests such that application of its law is neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair).
74. See, e.g., Ala. Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935) (applying
California workman’s compensation law to an employee injured in Alaska where the employer
was a non-Californian and the employment contract provided that Alaska Workmen’s
Compensation Law was to apply).
75. Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause,
110 YALE L.J. 785, 803 (2001).
76. See id. at 795.
77. Space limitations preclude me from fully developing and defending the point made in the
paragraph above in text (and in fact is the subject of a work-in-progress). See Rosen, supra note
62. An example of the earlier approach that sought to locate events and transactions in a single
polity was the “vested rights” doctrine in the field of conflict of laws. See Rosen, supra note 3, at
940.
78. Allstate, 449 U.S. at 307.
79. Such circumstances creating interests include the fact that many occurrences span
several states and the spillover effects that a transaction or occurrence may have.
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transaction or occurrence has “happened” such that only a single polity can
apply its law. In lieu of presuming that only one jurisdiction properly can
regulate each transaction or occurrence, today’s doctrine regularly permits
multiple states to exercise concurrent regulatory jurisdiction over a single
person, transaction, or occurrence.80
In short, the Supreme Court’s anti-extraterritoriality statements in its
Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence harken back to the now-discredited
era in which concurrent jurisdiction was resisted. The Court’s statements
categorically constraining states’ extraterritorial authority should be confined
to circumstances where states are pursuing protectionist agendas.81 To broadly
deny states the power to regulate matters that occur outside their borders
problematically hampers them by depriving states of the power over matters
that Due Process and Full Faith and Credit doctrines wisely have recognized as
being legitimate state interests.

80. See generally Rosen, supra note 3, at 945–63. Although concurrent jurisdiction creates
complications, the attempt to replace it with a system of non-overlapping regulatory jurisdiction
would simplify matters at too great a cost. For a discussion of this, see id. at 933–45.
81. Professor Kreimer criticizes my argument that the Court’s anti-extraterritorialism
statements should not be extended beyond protectionist legislation. See Kreimer, supra note 8, at
995–96. His first justification, that “[t]hese are categories of formidable obscurity, for one
person’s public welfare is another person’s protectionism,” id. at 995–96, flies in the face of
longstanding Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, which long has drawn distinctions between
protectionist and non-protectionist state legislation. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). Indeed, it is
unclear how much constitutional doctrine would remain if legal tests utilizing what some might
believe to have “obscure” borders were eliminated. Next, Professor Kreimer argues that “cases
which uphold ‘health and safety’ justifications in other Commerce Clause contexts do not rely on
‘morals,’ which seem to be the key ‘third party effects’ on which Professor Rosen relies.”
Kreimer, supra note 8, at 996. This argument is specious for three reasons: (1) a fair reading of
my article reveals that it was concerned with a wide range of state interests that could be
undermined by a citizen’s extraterritorial activities, see Rosen, supra note 3, at 877, not just or
even primarily with moral interests; (2) most extraterritorial regulations, including those related
to abortion, could be justified on multiple bases (for instance, extraterritorial abortion regulations
plausibly could be justified on the policy of protecting unborn fetuses as well as moral
considerations); and, in any event, (3) the logic the Court has embraced in adopting its lower level
scrutiny carries over to morals legislation: the Court has said that laws that “relat[e] to the health,
life, and safety of their citizen,” which derive from what “is compendiously known as the police
power,” are permissible if they do “not discriminate against interstate commerce or operate to
disrupt its required uniformity.” Head v. N.M. Bd. of Exam’rs in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424, 428–
29 (1963). Finally, the parade of horribles that Professor Kreimer recites would not occur
because my rejection of a per se ban on extraterritorial regulation does not call for eliminating all
judicial review of state legislation. Some of the hypotheticals Professor Kreimer describes appear
to be purely protectionist efforts that would be unlawful as a per se matter, and the others likely
would fail under Pike balancing.
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II. INTERSTATE RELATIONS PRINCIPLES POTENTIALLY RELEVANT TO STATE
EXTRATERRITORIAL REGULATIONS (POINTS TWO THROUGH FOUR)
Part I showed that states are not without power to regulate their out-ofstate citizens. This does not mean, however, that there are no limits on state
extraterritorial regulatory powers. Section A of Part II identifies several
constitutional principles relating to interstate relations that plausibly may be
relevant to determining whether a particular exercise of extraterritorial
regulation is impermissible. Section B shows that Utah’s effort to regulate
Mary would not be precluded under any of these doctrines as they currently are
understood by the Supreme Court. Section C suggests, however, that Section
B’s conclusion cannot be presumed to be stable because there has not been a
sustained practice of state extraterritorial regulations that has received
thoroughgoing attention from legislatures, the public, and the courts.
A.

Constitutional Principles Relevant to Analyzing Utah’s Effort to Regulate
Mary (Point Two)

Although States have presumptive powers to regulate their citizens’ out-ofstate conduct, several constitutional principles potentially constrain the
exercise of this power.82 These principles limit states’ baseline extraterritorial
powers for the sake of securing a particular sort of federal union. The primary
aspect of federalism these constitutional principles help determine is the nature
of interstate relations—what is generally termed “horizontal” federalism—not
the more typically analyzed “vertical” relationship between the federal
government and states.83 As a result of these constitutional principles, some
extraterritorial state regulations unquestionably, and quite properly, are
constitutionally impermissible.
The constitutional doctrines that, as a matter of first principles, potentially
could constrain state extraterritorial regulations are the right to travel, Article
IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Citizenship Clause and Privileges or Immunities Clause. It plausibly could be
argued, for example, that Utah’s effort to apply its restrictions to Mary while
she is in Utah violates Mary’s constitutional right to travel; the freedom to
partake of the liberties that California affords while one is in California, it

82. Professors Lea Brilmayer and Seth Kreimer each have propounded additional
“structural” arguments against state extraterritorial regulatory powers in relation to deeply
contested policy questions. See Lea Brilmayer, Interstate Preemption: The Right to Travel, The
Right to Life, and the Right to Die, 91 MICH. L. REV. 873, 876 (1993); Kreimer, “But Whoever
Treasures Freedom . . .”, supra note 19, at 922. I have fully recounted their arguments and, I
believe, discredited them. See Rosen, supra note 3, at 933–45.
83. For an admirably clear discussion of the difference between vertical and horizontal
federalism, see Metzger, supra note 10, at 1511–15.
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might be said, is necessary if the right to travel is to be meaningful.84
Similarly, a respectable argument can be made that Article IV’s guarantee that
“[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities
of Citizens in the several States”85 means that Mary is entitled to “all privileges
and immunities” enjoyed by California citizens when she visits California,
including the privilege of availing herself of California’s abortion laws.86
Likewise, it could be argued that the “privileges or immunities” of being a
“citizen[] of the United States” include that a traveling citizen be entitled to the
full array of benefits that are enjoyed by the citizens of the states through
which she is traveling.87
Another way to think about all of this is that these three constitutional
principles are important determinants of what state and national citizenship
mean in our country’s federal union. Indeed, the arguments sketched in the
immediately preceding paragraph, taken together, would create a particular
type of federal union. After showing below in Section B that contemporary
doctrine does not dictate the legal conclusions postulated in the paragraph
immediately above, but in fact would permit Utah to regulate Mary, Part III
considers the nature of the federal union that the arguments above would erect
and then contrasts that with the alternative conception of federalism that
contemporary doctrine currently embraces.
B.

Contemporary Doctrine (Point Three)

This Section B shows that contemporary doctrine pertaining to the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, the right to travel, and the Fourteenth
Amendment’s national Citizenship Clause and Privileges or Immunities Clause
would not bar Utah from regulating Mary during her travels to California.88

84. For a clear articulation of this position, see Kreimer, supra note 8, at 1006–08.
85. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
86. See Kreimer, supra note 8, at 983–84.
87. Id.
88. Although contemporary case law has treated Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s national Citizenship Clause and Privileges or
Immunities Clause as “components” of the right to travel, see Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500–
03 (1999), cases also continue to treat each of these as distinct constitutional principles. See, e.g.,
Hillside Dairy, Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59, 66–68 (2003). In other words, the right to travel has
not wholly swallowed these other constitutional principles. Consistent with this precedent, I will
treat these as distinct constitutional principles. Indeed, these principles’ continuing independent
existence is sensible because there is no reason to think that the right to travel exhausts the scope
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the national Citizenship Clause, or the Privileges or
Immunities Clause.
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The Privileges and Immunities Clause

Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause provides that “[t]he citizens
of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in
the several States.”89 As I have shown at length elsewhere, the United States
Supreme Court has unwaveringly held for more than a century and a quarter
that the Clause constrains the ways that a state may act toward visitors from
other states, but that it does not apply at all to a state’s regulation of its own
citizens.90 There is sensibility to this distinction between host states (to which
the Clause applies) and home states (to which it does not). As is suggested by
its universally accepted moniker, the “Comity Clause,” the Privileges and
Immunities Clause has been concerned with ensuring peaceful relations among
the states. Interstate peace is threatened when one state treats visitors
differently than it treats its own citizens, but is not generally jeopardized by
how a state regulates its own citizens.91 In more modern parlance, the Comity
Clause has been understood as a constitutional principle that serves a
representation-reinforcement function by limiting the extent to which the
paradigmatic unrepresented outsiders—non-citizens—can be regulated by a
polity.92 In short, under contemporary doctrine, which is grounded in
longstanding precedent, the Comity Clause does not have even threshold
application to Utah’s efforts to regulate its own citizen’s (Mary’s) activities
when she is in California.
89. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
90. See Rosen, supra note 3, at 900–03. Although Professor Kreimer acknowledges that the
Court in Bradwell held that the Privileges and Immunities Clause did not apply to the home state
and ultimately acknowledges that his theory (that the Comity Clause should apply to home states
as well as host states) would require that the Court “break some new ground,” Professor Kreimer
advances some hard-to-justify positions along the way. Kreimer, supra note 8, at 1003 & n.121.
He says that my argument that “Zobel v. Williams relied on the inapplicability of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause is mysterious” because “Zobel invalidated the statute at issue” and
“therefore, the Court could not have relied on the validity of the statute under Article IV.” Id.
(citations omitted). This is puzzling. The statute at issue in Zobel, which applied only to Alaskan
citizens but discriminated in its treatment of longstanding residents and new state citizens, was
challenged on both Privileges and Immunities and Equal Protection grounds. See Zobel v.
Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 56–58 (1982). While it is true that the statute was invalidated, the Court
struck it down solely on Equal Protection grounds, explicitly holding that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause was inapplicable because the statute only regulated citizens. Id. at 65. The
majority opinion, which I quoted in my previous article, stated as follows:
The statute does not involve the kind of discrimination which the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Art. IV was designed to prevent. That Clause “was designed to
insure to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B the same privileges which the
citizens of State B enjoy.” The Clause is thus not applicable to this case.
Zobel, 457 U.S. at 59–60 n.5 (citations omitted) (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395
(1948)); see also Rosen, supra note 3, at 902 (quoting and discussing same). This would
constitute a holding on virtually every definition of that term, pace Professor Kreimer. The Court
reiterated this understanding two years later in United Building & Construction Trades Council v.
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It might be objected that even if the Privileges and Immunities Clause does
not apply to Mary’s home state of Utah, it requires that California grant Mary
the same access to abortion while she visits the Golden State that is enjoyed by
Californians, regardless of what Utah law requires. It is very unlikely,
however, that the Privileges and Immunities Clause would impose any such
duty on California.93 The Privileges and Immunities Clause does not generate
an “absolute” duty for states to treat citizens and non-citizens alike.94 Rather,
states are permitted to draw lines between citizens and non-citizens—meaning
that California can deny Mary access to abortion facilities that California
residents are free to use—if “there is a substantial reason for the difference in
treatment” and “the discrimination practiced against nonresidents bears a
substantial relationship to the State’s objective.”95
The question thus would become whether California’s interest in not
meddling in Utah’s regulation of peripatetic Mary would qualify as a

Mayor & Council of Camden though its comments in Camden admittedly were not necessary to
the case’s ultimate disposition. 465 U.S. 208, 217 (1984) (noting that “disadvantaged New Jersey
residents have no claim under the Privileges and Immunities Clause” in respect of a New Jersey
statute solely because they are citizens of the regulating state).
91. I say “not generally” because it is possible, of course, for a state to regulate its citizens in
a manner that could breed interstate dissension, for instance by forbidding its citizens from
purchasing goods from another state. These types of regulations, however, are addressed by other
doctrines (in this case, the Dormant Commerce Clause).
92. See Camden, 465 U.S. at 217 (stating that New Jersey residents do not have a Privileges
and Immunities Clause challenge to a New Jersey law because “New Jersey residents at least
have a chance to remedy at the polls any discrimination against them”); JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
93. I believe this to be a very strong conclusion. In any event, even if my argument above in
text was wrong and the Privileges and Immunities Clause precluded California from withholding
its benefits from visitors from other states, this would not mean that the home state’s
extraterritorial regulation was illicit. Rather, this would mean that Mary would confront a
situation where the host state permits an activity that her home state proscribes. There is nothing
unconstitutional, or even particularly unusual, about such conflicts where two or more polities
have concurrent regulatory authority; indeed, the Model Penal Code anticipates this possibility
and specifically provides that a home state can prohibit its citizens from engaging in an activity
out of state that is permitted in that state. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03(2) (1962); see also
Rosen, supra note 3, at 870. Under such circumstances, there are a variety of steps the home state
can take to ensure compliance with its regulations. See Rosen, supra note 12, at 989–99. For
additional discussion of such conflicts, see supra note 90.
94. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502 (1999) (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396
(1948)).
95. Lunding v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 298 (1998). For examples of state
laws discriminating as between residents and nonresidents that were upheld against Privileges and
Immunities Clause challenges, see Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371,
390–91 (1978) (addressing a statute that required nonresidents to pay more than residents for
hunting license); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 445 (1973) (addressing a statute that charged
nonresidents more to attend state university).
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“substantial” reason for purposes of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
There are very good reasons for concluding in the affirmative. As I have
explained elsewhere at length, the cases striking down host state laws that
discriminated between citizens and non-citizens all have involved instances
where the host state sought to benefit itself at the expense of the home state,
not instances where the host state sought to assist the home state. The Court
has recognized that this distinction between “the unilateral imposition of a
disadvantage upon nonresidents” and deference to another state’s laws is
determinative in the context of Privileges and Immunities doctrine,96 and this
makes perfect sense to a doctrine that is designed to reduce interstate friction
and facilitate harmonious interstate relations.97 Indeed, even outside the
context of the Comity Clause, the Court has upheld as constitutionally
legitimate a host state’s desire to withhold the benefits of its law to a visitor for
the purpose of supporting the home state’s contrary policy.98 For all these
reasons, under contemporary law, the Privileges and Immunities Clause in all
likelihood would not preclude a state (such as California) from trying to
accommodate a sister state’s (Utah’s) contrary policies.
A final possible objection may appear to remain: even if California is not
constitutionally required to apply its abortion law to Mary, surely California is
not disallowed from permitting Mary access to its abortion facilities. While
this in all likelihood is true,99 it does not undermine the question this Article

96. See Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 667 n.12 (1975) (distinguishing between
“unilateral imposition of a disadvantage upon nonresidents” and “the value of reciprocity”).
97. See Rosen, supra note 3, at 904–09; see also Larry Kramer, The Myth of the
“Unprovided-for” Case, 75 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1065–69 (1989) (providing a similar analysis).
98. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975). Sosna upheld against Equal Protection and
right to travel challenges an Iowa law that imposed a one-year residency requirement for divorce.
Id. at 395, 410. The Court held that the Iowa law “may reasonably be justified” as reflecting the
State’s desire to avoid “officious intermeddling in matters in which another State has a paramount
interest.” Id. at 406–07. What made the other state’s interest paramount was the divorce
petitioners’ de facto citizenship: the petitioners for divorce in Iowa might really intend to return to
their true home states after obtaining an Iowa divorce, and in such a circumstance their home
states have the paramount interest. See id. at 407.
99. The statement in the text above that California would apply its law to Mary likely is true
for two reasons. First, California can apply its law because it has a constitutionally legitimate
basis for applying its law to a visitor. See, e.g., Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident
Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 502 (1939). Second, no federal constitutional provision would require
California to disregard its own law and apply another state’s law instead. See Rosen, supra note
12, at 933 & n.60 (explaining that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not generally require one
state to apply another state’s law). This was not always the case, though. Early case law required
State A to apply the law of State B when State B’s interest was paramount. It would not be
unthinkable to conclude that, on balance, Utah’s interest in regulating Mary’s abortion decision is
greater than California’s for so long as Mary remains a citizen of Utah. Though case law has
abandoned this approach, Congress likely has power under the Effects Clause to approach Full
Faith and Credit as the Court used to. See Rosen, supra note 12, at 960–70. There is much to be
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examines, whether Utah can regulate Mary’s out-of-state activities. This is
because the mere fact that California can regulate Mary says nothing about
another state’s power to regulate Mary. Under American law, multiple states
frequently have overlapping regulatory jurisdiction, meaning that they both can
apply their regulations simultaneously to a given transaction or occurrence,
“even when the states’ regulations substantively conflict.”100 Indeed, this
extends even to the criminal realm, such that two states with regulatory
jurisdiction over a particular activity can regulate with the result that the very
activity that is permitted by one state may be criminalized by the other.101
2.

The Right to Travel

Though the right to travel is a long-recognized constitutional principle,
Utah’s effort to regulate Mary while she is in California would not implicate
the right to travel as it has been doctrinally developed to date. To begin, no
Supreme Court case has held that State A’s effort to bar its citizen from doing
in State B what State B permits its own citizens to do implicates the right to
travel.102 Further, the United States Supreme Court recently presented a
restatement of the right to travel in Saenz v. Roe,103 and none of the “three
different components” of the right that it identified would apply to such
extraterritorial regulations.104 Utah’s regulation does not interfere with:
[1] the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State, [2] the
right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when
temporarily present in the second State, [or] [3] for those travelers who elect to

said for the notion that Full Faith and Credit doctrine properly takes account of the quantum of
the competing states’ interests in a matter in determining which state has the power to regulate,
see Rosen, supra note 3, at 960–62, and the institutional incapacities that plagued courts’ efforts
to formulate a principled doctrine that would accomplish this are not faced by legislatures. See
Mark D. Rosen, Should ‘Un-American’ Foreign Judgments Be Enforced?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 783,
817–23 (2004).
100. Rosen, supra note 3, at 949. See generally id. at 946–55. Most “conflicts” between state
laws do not impose conflicting duties on a person that cannot simultaneously be satisfied because
“conflicts” most typically arise where State A bars an activity that State B permits but does not
mandate. See id. at 958–59. California policy permitting nonresidents access to its abortion
facilities would create this sort of conflict. Conflicting state laws that actually imposed
inconsistent obligations that cannot be simultaneously satisfied, while rare, cannot be tolerated in
a federal union. The only solution is to depart from the norm of concurrent regulatory
jurisdiction and permit only one law to apply. I have argued elsewhere that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, not the Dormant Commerce Clause, is the appropriate doctrinal locus for
determining which state has the power to apply its law in such circumstances. See id. at 960–62.
101. See id. at 950.
102. See id. at 913–19; see also Kreimer, supra note 8, at 1008 (acknowledging this).
103. 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999).
104. See Rosen, supra note 3, at 913–14.
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become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that
105
State.

The third component patently has no application since Mary has no intention to
make California her permanent home and the first component would not be
triggered because Utah is not preventing Mary from leaving Utah. Although
the second component at first may sound as if it would be applicable to Utah’s
extraterritorial regulation, the Court has made clear that the second component
is none other than Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause,106 and that
provision, as shown immediately above in Part II.B.1, applies to host states
(California in this case) but not to a citizen’s home state (in this case Utah).
3.

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause and Privileges or
Immunities Clause

Nor would the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause nor its
Privileges or Immunities Clause, as they have been understood to date, apply
to Utah’s extraterritorial regulations. The opening words of the Fourteenth
Amendment declare the existence of national citizenship (designated persons
are “citizens of the United States”) and proclaim that “[n]o State shall make or
enforce any law that shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States.”107 The Slaughter-House Cases infamously defined the
content of “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” quite
minimally to include a narrow set of rights.108 Among these is “that a citizen
of the United States can, of his own volition, become a citizen of any State of
the Union by a bona fide residence therein, with the same rights as other
citizens of that State.”109 The Saenz Court relied on this construction of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause to ground what it called the “third component”
of the right to travel, which Saenz then utilized to strike down provisions of a
California law that gave new citizens of California less generous welfare
benefits than were provided to longstanding Californians.110 Utah’s

105. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500.
106. See id. at 501 (“The second component of the right to travel is . . . expressly protected by
the text of” the Privileges and Immunities Clause).
107. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
108. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S (16 Wall.) 36, 79–80 (1872) (privileges or immunities of
national citizenship include “the right of the citizen of this great country, protected by implied
guarantees of its Constitution, to ‘come to the seat of government to assert any claim he may have
upon that government, to transact any business he may have with it, to seek its protection, to
share its offices, to engage in administering its functions. He has the right of free access to its
seaports, through which all operation of foreign commerce are conducted, to the subtreasuries,
land offices, and courts of justice in the several States.’” (quoting Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 35, 44 (1867))).
109. Id. at 80.
110. See Saenz, 526 U.S at 511.
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extraterritorial regulation would not fall under the privileges or immunities of
national citizenship that were the subject of Saenz, nor under the other
privileges or immunities identified in the Slaughter-House Cases.111
Finally, no other cases have identified additional rights apart from the
aforementioned “privileges or immunities” that arise from the national
citizenship that is declared in the Fourteenth Amendment’s first sentence.112
Taken together, this means that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship
Clause and Privileges or Immunities Clause, as they have been understood to
date, would not apply to Utah’s regulations of Mary.
C. That Current Doctrine Cannot Be Safely Assumed to Be Settled in
Relation to States’ Extraterritorial Powers (Point Four)
Although current constitutional doctrines would not preclude Utah from
prohibiting Mary from obtaining an abortion in California, it could not be
safely assumed that the current state of the law discussed immediately above in
Section B is settled. This is so for several reasons. First, although states have
been regulating their citizens’ extraterritorial conduct from the earliest days of
our country’s history,113 the practice has not been widespread and has not
received considerable attention. There accordingly is not a societal consensus
concerning extraterritorial regulation embodied either in widespread practice
or broad-ranging acceptance that this is a legitimate (albeit unusual) form of
state regulation. Nor has the Supreme Court ever directly confronted the
constitutionality of a home state’s effort to extraterritorially regulate its
citizens to ensure that they do not seek to circumvent the home state’s policies.
Another cause for uncertainty as to the stability of the jurisprudence
surveyed above is that two of the doctrinal formulations leave ready room for
further development.114 Consider first the right to travel. The Court in Saenz
stated that “‘[t]he right to travel’ discussed in our cases embraces at least three
different components.”115 This indicates that the three components are not
necessarily exhaustive of the right to travel. Moreover, a plausible argument
can be made that Utah’s regulation already falls within an expanded form of
the “first” component of the right to travel: the right to leave one state to visit
another, it might be said, would become but a “hollow shell” if the home state

111. See supra note 99.
112. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 511 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting the same).
113. See supra notes 21–35 and accompanying text.
114. This is not always the case. When the Court explained the political question doctrine in
Baker v. Carr, for example, it explicitly stated that the six factors it identified as predicates for a
finding of nonjusticiablity under the doctrine were an exhaustive list. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)
(“Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no
dismissal for non-justiciability on the ground of a political question’s presence.”).
115. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500 (emphasis added).
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can preclude its traveling citizen from enjoying all the benefits that another
state allows its citizens.116
Consider next the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities
Clause. Although the Slaughter-House Cases’ enumeration of the contents of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause has not been expanded by subsequent case
law, Slaughter-House itself expressly understood that it was providing a nonexhaustive list. Before furnishing its famous enumeration, after all, the Court
said as follows:
Having shown that the privileges and immunities relied on in the argument
are those which belong to citizens of the States as such . . . and [are] not by this
article placed under the special care of the Federal government, we may hold
ourselves excused from defining the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States which no State can abridge, until some case involving those
privileges may make it necessary to do so.
But lest it should be said that no such privileges and immunities are to be
found if those we have been considering are excluded, we venture to suggest
some which owe their existence to the Federal government, its National
117
character, its Constitution, or its laws.

As to the final doctrine examined above, Article IV’s Privileges and
Immunities Clause, the doctrine as formulated is less inviting of alteration than
the right to travel or the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities
Clause. The doctrine is not written in language that explicitly invites
expansion. Further, as regards the doctrinal issue that would be relevant to the
Comity Clause’s application to Utah’s regulation—whether that Clause applies
to home states—case law for more than a century consistently has
unequivocably answered “no.”118 There nevertheless have been some
scholarly calls for changing the doctrine. Professor Kreimer has argued that
the Court should modify contemporary doctrine so that the Comity Clause
would also apply to the home state.119 Professor Fallon believes that this is a
“plausible argument”120 since the Comity Clause, read literally, does not
differentiate between home and host states. I think the textual argument to be
less strong than may at first appear because the Comity Clause is found in
Article IV, and the rest of Article IV deals with relationships among the states,
not a single state’s relationship with its own citizens. But this is far from a

116. See Kreimer, supra note 8, at 1007; see also Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy:
Does the Privileges or Immunities Revival Portend the Future—Or Reveal the Structure of the
Present?, 113 HARV. L. REV. 110, 152 (1999).
117. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78–79 (1872) (emphasis added).
118. See supra Part II.B.1.
119. Kreimer, supra note 8, at 1003 & n.121.
120. Fallon, supra note 2, at 635.
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devastating objection,121 and I agree that the text of the Comity Clause
plausibly could be read to entitle a Utah citizen who is visiting California to
“all Privileges and Immunities” that are enjoyed by the California citizens in
California.
In the end, whether the longstanding, consistent precedent establishing that
the Privileges and Immunities Clause is inapplicable to home states should be
abandoned primarily turns, it seems to me, on straightforward normative
arguments. The same is true for the direction that the right to travel and the
Privileges or Immunities Clause takes. For these reasons, it is to normative
considerations that this Article now turns.
III. NORMATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS (POINTS FIVE
THROUGH SEVEN)
Having shown in Part I that states have extraterritorial regulatory powers
and in Part II that several constitutional principles potentially could be
developed so as to limit such powers, this Part III explains why normative
considerations invariably will influence how doctrine ultimately is developed
(Section A), shows that there are powerful arguments on behalf of two
different approaches to answering the question of whether states should have
extraterritorial powers to regulate their citizens (Section B), and then considers
which governmental institutions are best suited to choosing between the two
alternatives (Section C).
A.

The Triple Duty Played by Normative Considerations (Point Five)

On the assumption that the current doctrine is not necessarily stable,
answering the doctrinal question of whether Utah may regulate Mary’s
California visit invariably will turn on normative considerations for three
reasons. First, whether Utah’s extraterritorial regulation triggers as a threshold
matter any of the constitutional principles discussed above—the right to travel,

121. For one reason, the Guarantee Clause, which is found in Article IV, could be said to
address a state’s relationship with its own citizens. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States
shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government . . . .”). But see
Metzger, supra note 10, at 1497 (construing the Guarantee Clause as concerning interstate
relations). Further, a state’s regulation of its own citizens could have interstate effects. It also
might be objected that Article IV is a “structural” rather than a rights-generating part of the
Constitution, though I am skeptical of the utility of this distinction insofar as structural limitations
on governmental power frequently can be said to generate rights on the part of individuals not to
be regulated in a particular fashion. In any event, it simply is not the case that Article IV does not
contain provisions that generate individual rights. The Full Faith and Credit Clause, for example,
certainly has been a source that individuals have relied on to claim the right to have a judgment
obtained in one state’s courts enforced in another. See, e.g., Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230
(1908) (citing the Full Faith and Credit Clause in argument for enforcing a Missouri judgment in
Mississippi).
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the privileges or immunities of national citizenship, or Article IV’s Privileges
and Immunities Clause—is not answered by clear constitutional text,
longstanding tradition, or precedent. Accordingly, determining whether (1)
Utah’s extraterritorial regulations would even implicate “right to travel”
concerns as a threshold matter, whether (2) the “privileges or immunities” that
flow from national citizenship entail some right to have access to the goods
and services available in the sister states to which a United States citizen
travels, and whether (3) the “privileges and immunities” of state citizenship to
which a traveling citizen of State A is entitled may as a threshold matter be
encroached upon by her home state, will turn, at least in part, on normative
considerations under virtually every theory of constitutional interpretation.
Normative considerations are likely to be doctrinally relevant in two
additional respects, though some background first must be laid to see how.
Even if it should be determined that extraterritorial regulations of the sort
imposed by Utah in our hypothetical implicate any or all of the abovementioned constitutional principles as a threshold matter, the question would
arise whether a particular extraterritorial regulation violated the constitutional
provision.122 This is so because virtually no constitutional principles are
categorical. For example, though the Speech Clause “embodies our profound
national commitment to the free exchange of ideas,” and while it is true that
“[a]s a general matter, the First Amendment means that government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter,
or its content,” the Supreme Court also has noted that “this principle, like other
First Amendment principles, is not absolute.”123 Consistent with this, “free
speech doctrine permits government to restrict a non-trivial quantum of
expression on account of content.”124 Thus the mere fact that a given

122. Professor Fallon makes this point with regard to the right to travel. See Fallon, supra
note 2, at 638 (observing that although “[i]t is surely arguable that state laws barring their citizens
from procuring out-of-state abortions would violate the long recognized constitutional right of
interstate travel . . . [,] [i]t would probably be a mistake . . . to regard it as simply settled that a
state’s prohibition against out-of-state abortions of fetuses conceived within the prohibiting state
would always and necessarily violate the right to travel.”).
123. Aschcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (internal quotation omitted).
124. Rosen, Institutional Context, supra note 55, at 249. Indeed,
[n]ot only may American governments regulate obscene materials and fighting words, but
government may ban speech that constitutes espionage, enact “content-based advertising
restrictions” in relation to the sale of securities, prohibit the advocacy of illegal activities,
enact “content-based [regulations] of [labor union] elections and election campaigns—
including restrictions on accurate representations by employers about the future
consequences of unionization,” and more.
See id. (internal quotation and citations omitted). Relatedly, Adam Winkler recently has shown
that constitutional principles that give rise to strict scrutiny of legislative and executive actions
very frequently do not result in determinations that the governmental actions are unconstitutional.
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expression triggers free speech principles as a threshold matter does not mean
that government regulation of that expression violates the Constitution.
What is true for the speech principle is true for the constitutional right to
travel principle as well. Thus the Court has explicitly held that the “second
component of the right to travel” provides “protections [that] are not
‘absolute’”—states are not categorically proscribed from discriminating
against citizens who are visiting from other states, but only are prevented from
“discriminat[ing] against citizens of other States where there is no substantial
reason for the discrimination . . . .”125 What the Court has identified as the
“third” component of the right to travel likewise appears not to be
categorical.126 Accordingly, even if the Court were to recognize a fourth
component of the right to travel that encompassed state efforts to
extraterritorially regulate their citizens, the Court would then have to devise a
legal test to gauge such regulations’ constitutionality. The same would be true
if the Court were to decide that a home state’s extraterritorial regulations
implicated the “privileges or immunities” of national citizenship.
It is at this point that normative considerations once again come into play.
Why is it that constitutional principles (almost always) are not categorical?127
Part of the answer128 clearly is this: the absence of categorical prohibitions
reflects the Court’s appreciation of the fact that there always are countervailing
See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny
in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006).
125. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501–02 (1999) (internal citations omitted). The second
component of the right to travel, said the Court, has a textual basis in the Constitution: Article
IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause, which was discussed above. See id. at 501.
126. See id. at 504. The Court declined to precisely identify the appropriate standard for
reviewing state regulations that implicate this component of the right to travel. See id. At one
point the Court stated that “[t]he appropriate standard may be more categorical than that
articulated” in Shapiro v. Thompson. Id. The Shapiro Court used a standard very close to strict
scrutiny, holding that a classification violated equal protection unless it could have been “shown
to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.” Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 634 (1969). Yet, the Saenz opinion subsequently spent five pages analyzing the
justifications California gave for its regulation. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 504–08. Had the
constitutional principle operated categorically, there would have been no need for the Saenz Court
to undertake such analysis.
127. The only contemporary exceptions are the Court’s quasi-Tenth Amendment categorical
anti-commandeering rules. See Mark D. Rosen, Modeling Constitutional Doctrine, 49 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 691, 703–04 (2005). For a strong critique of the Court’s decision to operationalize the
constitutional anti-commandeering principle by means of categorical legal tests, see Vicki C.
Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV.
2180, 2182–83 (1998); see also Rosen, supra, at 703–06.
128. Answering this is surprisingly difficult because of an unfortunate truth: despite the
paucity of categorical constitutional principles and the ubiquity of non-categorical legal tests, see
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001), neither the Court nor
scholars have paid much attention to the criteria for selecting the appropriate legal test. See
Rosen, supra note 127, at 704–06; Rosen, Institutional Context, supra note 55, at 234 & n.58.
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considerations of which constitutional doctrine appropriately takes account.129
Stated differently, life and the world are too complex to have “absolute”
constitutional doctrines that categorically bar the government from regulating
speech, interfering with the free exercise of religion, and so forth. Rather, even
our most special and fundamental rights and liberties can be regulated—
typically for only “compelling interests” and in “narrowly tailored” ways
pursuant to “strict scrutiny,” but sometimes for even less significant
governmental interests and in less precisely targeted ways.130 Choosing which
non-categorical legal test is to be used to evaluate governmental action that
implicates constitutionally protected interests invariably reflects an assessment
of the strength of the countervailing considerations in relation to the weight of
the constitutional principle against which they cut. Such determinations, it
would seem, invariably will turn at least in part—and, more likely,
primarily131—on normative considerations.132
Normative considerations play an important role at yet one additional
point. Even after the legal test has been chosen, courts must decide when the

129. For example, under contemporary doctrine, although women unquestionably have a
constitutional privacy interest in relation to abortion, the Court has concluded that the state has an
interest in the health of the unborn fetus. The legal test that the Court has devised to measure the
constitutionality of state laws that regulate abortion prior to viability—the “undue burden”
standard—is, according to the Court, the “appropriate means of reconciling the State’s interest
with the woman’s constitutionally protected liberty.” Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992).
130. For example, although abortion rights are an aspect of fundamental privacy rights, the
undue burden standard that presently applies to abortion regulations is less strict than strict
scrutiny. Id. at 846–48, 871 (justifying adoption of the undue burden standard on the basis that it
is less strict than strict scrutiny and affords the state greater leeway in regulating in relation to the
“potential life” of the fetus).
131. Though I need not establish this stronger proposition for purposes of this Article, the
intuition behind the proposition is that the selection of appropriate legal tests is not generally
informed by textual or historical analysis. Constitutional text mentions none of the legal tests that
populate our constitutional jurisprudence; if anything, text almost always suggests that
constitutional principles are categorical, a doctrinal approach that contemporary constitutional
jurisprudence almost always rejects. See Rosen, supra note 127, at 705. Nor did the Framers
discuss legal tests. What is left in choosing the appropriate legal test, then, is precedent and
normative considerations.
132. In this regard I largely agree with Justice Scalia’s argument in his dissent in Casey that
application of the undue burden standard invariably is dependent upon a “value judgment” as to
the comparative value of the woman’s liberty to choose and the fetus. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 983
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). But I reject Justice Scalia’s
assumption that the Court can act in a manner that sidesteps value judgments of these sort. The
way to maintain the Court’s legitimacy is not by demanding that it avoid value judgments—
something I believe to be impossible—but by expanding the institutional actors that actively
participate in determining what our Constitution requires. Much of my recent work, and several
ongoing projects, seek to work out the implications of these ideas. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note
12, at 967–77.
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test has been satisfied such that the governmental action survives constitutional
challenge. Excellent empirical analysis has definitively established that even
“strict scrutiny” is not always (or even generally) fatal in practice; courts not
infrequently determine that strictly protected constitutional interests can be
regulated because there are countervailing governmental interests that count as
“compelling.”133 The determination of what countervailing government
interests are compelling invariably requires a normative assessment.134
To quickly summarize, normative considerations likely enter constitutional
analysis at three distinct points: (1) the threshold definition of the scope of the
constitutional principle, (2) the choice among non-categorical legal tests to
operationalize the constitutional principle, and (3) the determination of which
governmental policies satisfy the chosen legal test.
B.

Normative Considerations: The Difficult Choice Between “Soft” and
“Hard” Pluralism (Point Six)

Having shown immediately above in Section A (point five) that normative
considerations invariably will inform the development of the constitutional
doctrines that are relevant to analyzing Utah’s hypothetical regulation, this
Section B labors to make the relatively modest point that there are strong
normative arguments for two contending positions. The discussion in this
point six is not designed to definitively vindicate one of the two candidates, but
to lay the foundation for the next subsection’s institutional conclusion that
difficult normative decisions of this sort are better undertaken by the more
political branches (Congress and the President) than by courts.
1.

Defining “Soft” and “Hard” Pluralism

Let us return to our hypothetical: should Utah have the power to preclude
Mary from obtaining an abortion in California? The first position, that Utah
should not be able to regulate Mary extraterritorially, has been well stated by
many able scholars135 and has obvious appeal to many. Arguments that have
been made on its behalf primarily boil down to two claims: that disenabling
Utah (1) enhances the liberty of individuals such as Mary and (2) vindicates
the primacy of national citizenship. As to the first, disallowing such
extraterritorial regulation expands Mary’s liberty, it is said, by enabling her to
do something in California that she is not permitted to do in her home state of
Utah. This theme has been elaborated in near-poetic ways by Professor

133. See Winkler, supra note 124, at 812–23, 833–69.
134. Indeed, in practice it may involve a comparative assessment of the strength of the
countervailing considerations in relation to the constitutional principle against which they cut,
though this stronger proposition is not essential to the argument here.
135. See, e.g., Brilmayer, supra note 82, at 876; Kreimer, supra note 8; Kreimer, The Law of
Choice and Choice of Law, supra note 19.
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Kreimer. Permitting Utah to extraterritorially regulate is tantamount to making
Mary “carry home-state law with [her] as [she] travel[s], like escaped prisoners
dragging a ball and chain.”136 “In our federal system,” he also has said, “by
stepping over [state] lines an American citizen may claim her freedom.”137
As to the second claim concerning the primacy of national citizenship,
consider the following statement:
At the time the United States was founded, one could conceive of American
citizenship as derived from a more basic identification with each of the
component states . . . .
. . . At the time of the Civil War, Robert E. Lee resigned his federal
commission, and renounced his oath of allegiance because as a “Virginian” he
could not bear to honor that oath. It is hard today to find a citizen of the
United States who conceives of her primary identity as a “Virginian” or a
“Pennsylvanian” or an “Oregonian,” rather than an “American,” and our nation
is stronger for this fact.
In my view, it is precisely the fact that a resident of Pennsylvania comes to
New Jersey as an American citizen that entitles her without blame to take
advantage of the “privileges and immunities” offered by New Jersey, whether
to wager on games of chance or to end an unwanted pregnancy. This does no
violence to the authority of Pennsylvania within its boundaries but recognizes
that the primary moral community to which we all owe allegiance is that of the
138
United States of America.

I shall have a few critical words to say about these arguments in support of the
first position, but first let me sketch the second plausible position.
The second position, that Utah should have the power to prohibit Mary
from obtaining an abortion in California, also has significant force. Under our
federal system, states may have diverse policies in relation to matters that
neither the Constitution nor federal law demands nationwide uniformity. But,
as regards a non-trivial set of laws, such pluralism of policy choices can be
undermined if the citizen of a state that prohibits the activity in question can
simply travel to a state that does not proscribe the activity and do there what
her home state proscribes—what might be called “travel-evasion” from the
perspective of her home state.139 Accordingly, what is at stake in determining
whether Utah can regulate Mary such that she does not engage in “travelevasion” of legitimate Utah laws is the extent to which states can maintain
efficacious diverse policies in relation to those matters that neither the
Constitution nor other federal law demands nationwide uniformity.

136.
137.
138.
139.

Kreimer, The Law of Choice and Choice of Law, supra note 19, at 463.
Kreimer, supra note 8, at 1017.
Id. at 983–84.
See Rosen, supra note 3.
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To be clear, extraterritorial regulation to address potential travel-evasion is
not confined to the context of abortion. The possibility of travel-evasion in
relation to state law is present whenever State B permits an activity that State
A prohibits for paternalistic purposes, to protect third-party interests, or to
generate norms in State A.140 Consider, for instance, a state law that bans
gambling: the state policies of protecting the gambler from himself and
protecting his family’s assets will be largely vitiated if the gambler is free to
gamble in Las Vegas. The same is true of state laws banning assisted suicide,
mandating motorcycle helmets, and, if Roe v. Wade were to be overruled,
proscribing abortions. Indeed, even if Roe v. Wade remains good law, the
issue of travel-evasion arises in relation to abortion-related laws such as
parental notification statutes.141 Moreover, the problem of travel-evasion is not
confined to “hot-button” cultural conflict issues, but can arise in the
commercial context. For example, Wisconsin not long ago sought to apply its
substantively constitutional dairy regulations to milk sales by large Wisconsin
dairy farms that were consummated in Illinois so as to evade Wisconsin
regulations that aimed to protect third party interests.142
Notice the connection between the power of states to prevent travelevasion and the degree of political pluralism that can be expected to be found
across the country. If travel-evasion can be legally targeted, then states can
ensure full enforcement of their laws; the mere fact that State B chooses not to

140. State policies that aim to norm-generate can be subject to travel-evasion insofar as norm
inculcation is a function of the widespread practice of persons that an individual knows. Normgeneration may be undercut if I know that my neighbor is undertaking in a neighboring state the
very acts that our home state prohibits. See id. at 915.
141. Travel-evasion was the predicate, in fact, for bills recently enacted by the House and
Senate. See supra note 13; Child Custody Protection Act: Hearing on H.R. 1755 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (2004)
(“Despite widespread support for parental involvement laws and clear public policy
considerations justifying them, substantial evidence exists that such laws are regularly evaded by
adults who transport minors to abortion providers in States that do not have parental notification
or consent laws. The Child Custody Protection Act would curb the interstate circumvention of
these laws.”) (statement of Rep. Steve Chabot, Chairman, Subcomm. on the Constitution); see
also Child Custody Protection Act, S. 851, 108th Cong. (2004).
142. The Wisconsin regulators were concerned that smaller dairy farms were being driven out
of business because purchasers of raw milk paid premiums to large Wisconsin dairy farms in
excess of the economic savings that attended the purchase of milk for large farms. Dean Foods
Co. v. Brancel, 187 F.3d 609, 611 (7th Cir. 1999). To deprive large Wisconsin farms of financial
benefits that were not the result of economic efficiencies and thereby engender fairer competition,
Wisconsin prohibited premiums to the extent they exceeded the real economic savings of
purchasing milk from large farms. Id. The large Wisconsin farms then engaged in classic travelevasion: with the express purpose of avoiding the Wisconsin law, they restructured the sales so
that they technically were consummated in Illinois, which did not have such a restriction on
premiums. Id. at 612. Wisconsin then sought to apply its regulations extraterritorially to those
Illinois sales. Id.; see also Rosen, supra note 3, at 930–31 (discussing Dean Foods).
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proscribe what State A prohibits does not mean that State A’s citizens can
effectively opt out of State A’s laws by the expedient of driving to State B. A
federal regime in which travel-evasion can be targeted thus allows for the
possibility of what might be called “hard” pluralism: states can establish
efficacious regulations across the spectrum of policies with regard to which
federal law does not demand nationwide uniformity.143 By contrast, the first
position sketched above—under which Utah cannot regulate Mary’s California
conduct—can be usefully described as a regime of “soft” pluralism: states can
regulate as they wish as regards matters that federal law does not require
national uniformity, but they can make sure that their citizens abide by their
policies only when their citizens are physically located within the state’s
borders. Under a regime of “soft” pluralism, the ready possibility of crossing a
border to a more regulatorily relaxed state undermines the extent to which the
more regulatorily-heavy states can, as a practical matter, regulate as they see
fit. A regime of “soft” pluralism—a system in which states cannot proscribe
travel evasion—accordingly has a systematic bias against efficacious
regulation of matters about which there is not a national consensus. Indeed,
this characteristic of “soft” pluralism is explicitly lauded by its proponents:
“Where the moral judgment of two sovereigns clashes, federalism leaves the
citizen some opportunity to take advantage of the judgment of either.”144
2.

Clarifying What Appropriately Informs the Choice Between “Soft”
and “Hard” Pluralism

What should inform the choice between “soft” and “hard” pluralism?
Though I personally am sympathetic to “hard” pluralism,145 my interest here is
not to convince the reader of its superiority, but only to clarify what is really at
stake in choosing between these two options. In so doing, though, I must
critique some of the aforementioned arguments that have been made on behalf
of “soft” pluralism.
To begin, let us recall the argument that constitutional doctrine
appropriately disallows Utah from prohibiting Mary from obtaining an
abortion in California because such a doctrine augments Mary’s liberty. This
is the assumption behind the claim that “by stepping over [state] lines an
143. Of course, the existence of state and/or federal power to target travel-evasion does not
entail the exercise of that power. A federal regime of “hard” pluralism thus would allow room for
State A to decide to limit its citizen’s activities only for so long as she remains within State A’s
border. But this only underscores the political diversity that a “hard diversity” regime creates:
under such a regime, with respect to policies that federal law does not require national uniformity,
a state may decide (1) to not regulate its citizens at all, (2) to regulate its citizens only for so long
as they are physically present within the state, or (3) to regulate its citizens when they are both in
state and out of state.
144. Kreimer, supra note 8, at 1017.
145. See Rosen, supra note 3, at 911–13.
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American citizen may claim her freedom.”146 This argument, however, is
premised on a mistaken conception of the telos of constitutional law that most
people do not share and that actually bears no particular relationship to the
issue of extraterritoriality. Contrary to this argument’s implicit assumption,
the touchstone for constitutionality is not whether a proposed doctrine
minimizes the degree to which government may regulate and thereby
“interfere” with an individual’s liberty to do what she wishes. Rather,
regulations that restrict an individual’s liberty to act may be constitutionally
legitimate when they seek to achieve any one of an array of goals, including
the protection of third party interests and the pursuit of paternalism and norm
generation.147 This is not to say that state regulations that aim to accomplish
these goals are always constitutional; federal constitutional principles impose
many limits on what and how states may regulate. But when state regulations
do not run afoul of these constitutional limitations, there is no self-evident
normative basis for saying that a proposed constitutional doctrine “enhances”
liberty by enabling persons to avoid otherwise constitutional state regulations
that are applicable to her.
Indeed, further reflection suggests that the foundation for the libertyenhancing argument in support of “soft” pluralism must either be substantive
opposition to Utah’s law or libertarian desire to minimize government
regulation in general. Substantive opposition to Utah’s law, however, is not an
appropriate normative basis for advocating constitutional doctrines that restrict
state extraterritorial regulation as a general matter. Although libertarian
opposition to regulation as a general matter is a plausible normative
commitment that could inform constitutional doctrine on many theories of
constitutional interpretation, one who is persuaded by the liberty-enhancing
argument against extraterritoriality should realize that libertarianism is what
she really is embracing.
The second argument offered on behalf of “soft” pluralism—that national
citizenship today does and should supersede state citizenship—also misses the
mark (though, as I shall show, it at least points us in the right direction).
Constitutional doctrine that permitted Utah to extraterritorially regulate Mary
would not pit Utah against the nation and amount to a victory of state
citizenship as against national citizenship. Rather, doctrine that permitted such
extraterritorial regulation would help create a federal union in which national
citizenship had a particular content and meaning. More specifically, a regime
of “hard” pluralism defines our nation as a union of states that, with regard to
those policies about which there is no federal requirement of national
uniformity, have the power both to enact laws that embody policies that are at

146. Kreimer, supra note 8, at 1017.
147. See Rosen, supra note 3, at 883.
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odds with their neighbors’ policies and to ensure that such laws are strongly
enforced.
A federal system in which states had such powers is not tantamount to a
regime in which national citizenship takes a second seat to state citizenship.
The normative justification for a regime of “hard” pluralism is not that an
individual’s identity as a resident of Illinois is more significant to her than her
American identity; I fully concur with Professor Kreimer both that this is
unlikely to be the case today and that the emergence of a dominant national
identity is a good thing.148 Rather, the justification for a regime of “hard”
pluralism (to the extent there is a plausible justification) is that our country’s
enormous population and its citizens’ diverse preferences make a regime of
“hard” pluralism normatively attractive. In short, at issue is not whether state
citizenship takes precedence over federal citizenship, but the nature of national
citizenship in our federal union.
The normative attractiveness of “hard” pluralism is based on three distinct
considerations that have been well rehearsed by federalism scholars. First,
given the diversity of political commitments held by people in our large
country, it may be desirable to allow the fullest possible political expression to
those policies that federal law does not require national uniformity. Second, it
may be beneficial to allow states to experiment with different policies that
national law does not, at any given point in time, demand national
uniformity.149 Third, it may be desirable to give the citizens of our enormous
country an opportunity to actively participate in sub-federal democratic
politics, and this may be facilitated by giving room for people to participate in
lawmaking in respect of matters about which people feel strongly. The
argument in support of “hard” pluralism is that it supports these three goals
more than “soft” pluralism does.
In short, it is no contradiction in terms to feel primary allegiance to a
national identity that is committed to allowing “hard” pluralism at the subfederal levels in respect of policies that neither the United States Constitution
nor federal statutes demand national uniformity. Neither the “nature” of
national citizenship nor the primary role that national citizenship plays for
most of us answers the question of whether Utah should be able
extraterritorially regulate Mary. Professor Kreimer’s “national primacy”
argument points to the right direction, but it buries the difficult normative
analysis that appropriately informs the choice between “hard” and “soft”

148. See Kreimer, supra note 8, at 983–84.
149. These two arguments—diversity and experimentalism—are distinct. “Experimentalism”
anticipates the possibility that one policy may be proven over time to be superior to others such
that it may become the single or dominant policy, whereas “diversity” contentedly contemplates
the possibility of enduring differences in policy commitments.
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pluralism. And that very difficult question is as follows: what kind of federal
union do we want to have?
C. Institutional Considerations (Point Seven)
As shown above in points one to three, under current doctrine states have
the power to extraterritorially regulate their citizens to address travel-evasion.
That is to say, the current answer to the question of whether, as a purely
descriptive matter, our federal union is one of “hard” or “soft” pluralism is the
former. I also have labored to show in point four, however, that this status quo
is not necessarily stable because (among other reasons) it has not received
extensive attention and there are several plausible constitutional principles that
could be developed in a way that would constrain such state extraterritorial
powers.
This final part of the Article considers which societal actors are best
situated to choosing between “hard” and “soft” pluralism. My argument is that
it is perfectly sensible for states to currently have the power to extraterritorially
regulate, and for them to exercise the power as they wish. This will give our
society data points as to how such a system will operate in practice.
Ultimately, however, I conclude that federal institutions are better situated to
answering the question of what type of federal union our country should have.
Further, I argue that the Congress and the President, by means of legislation,
are institutionally superior to federal courts for the purpose of choosing
between “hard” and “soft” federalism. The Article then concludes by
identifying the appropriate sources of congressional power for making such a
decision: (1) the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s “Effects” Clause, (2) Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to create legislation that “enforces” what is
entailed by national citizenship, and possibly (3) Article IV’s Privileges and
Immunities Clause. Although the Commerce Clause also potentially could be
relied upon, it is a less conceptually suited constitutional locus than these other
provisions to the task at hand of deciding the nature of our federal union.
1.

The Superiority of Federal to State Actors

Once it is clearly understood what is at stake in determining the scope of
states’ extraterritorial powers, it readily follows that federal actors are
institutionally superior to individual states in making the decision. The choice
between “hard” and “soft” pluralism has important implications in respect of
the character of our federal union: is it a union in which national citizenship
entails that all citizens can have ready access to the laws and public goods of
all states, or is it a union in which a sub-federal polity can ensure that its
citizens abide by its distinctive public policies wherever she may be for so long
as she remains a citizen of the state? The federal government is well-suited
because it is inclusive of all interested parties; the political body that represents
all should make decisions that concern the character of the whole. The
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individual states are not well-suited to deciding the nature of national
citizenship and our federal union. They can be expected to give short shrift to
systemic federal considerations because looking out for the federal union is not
part of their charge.
A similar conclusion emerges when one scales back the level of generality
and abstraction of what is at issue. The question posed by our hypothetical
concerning Mary is the scope of states’ regulatory jurisdiction. What political
entity is best suited to answering the question? States cannot be trusted to be
the final arbiters of their own powers for two reasons. First, they (like all
bureaucracies) are inclined to augment the scope of their own powers even
absent good policy reasons for doing so. Second, there is a problem of
externalities; the “costs” of a state expanding its extraterritorial powers will fall
in significant part upon non-citizens, persons who are not politically
represented in the state that is making the decision.
The federal government does not fall prey to these two structural
disadvantages. To take the second concern first, the federal government
represents all states. When it determines the scope of states’ extraterritorial
powers, the federal government’s decisions accordingly impose no
externalities on unrepresented outsiders. This is why the federal government is
better suited than the states themselves to umpiring states’ powers vis-B-vis one
another. As to the first concern, there is little room for worry that the federal
government will act in a self-aggrandizing manner when it decides horizontal
federalism matters; sorting out the powers that states have vis-B-vis one
another does not increase federal power at the expense of states and so does
not invite the concerns that attend allowing a bureaucracy to define the scope
of its own powers.150 In short, determining the scope of subfederal polities’
regulatory powers in relation to one another is a “quintessentially federal
function.”151
2.

The Superiority of Congress (and the President) to Courts

a.

Congress’s Institutional Superiority

Even if (as I argued above) the federal government is institutionally
superior to states to the task of choosing between “hard” and “soft” pluralism,
the question remains as to how the decision-making appropriately is divided
among the various branches of the federal government. The analysis provided
above in point six (which identified the strong normative considerations in
favor of both “hard” and “soft” pluralism) in conjunction with point four’s
150. See Metzger, supra note 10, at 1513 (explaining that “the dangers of congressional
aggrandizement are mitigated in interstate or horizontal federalism contexts” unlike the context of
vertical federalism).
151. See Rosen, supra note 12, at 940.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

752

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 51:713

observation (that the choice between the two regimes has not been clearly
made by constitutional text, history, or precedent) jointly suggest that the more
political branches of the federal government are better suited than courts to
making such an inherently subjective, political choice. Courts simply do not
have any particular institutional competency in choosing among the competing
normative considerations to make the choice between “hard” and “soft”
pluralism.
Only clear cut institutional advantages would justify allocating this heavily
normative-based decision to the least democratically accountable branch of
government. I see no reasons for concluding that Congress (in conjunction
with the President’s participation via, among other things, the constitutional
requirement of Presentment) is institutionally incapable or suspect in regard to
making the intrinsically normative, political decision as to what type of federal
union we are to have. Indeed, there are reasons to believe that Congress is a
superior forum for the principled investigation and debate of such deeply
normative questions,152 though more attention than I can commit here is
appropriately devoted to these issues of each branch’s institutional
competencies.
b.

Constitutional Bases for Congress’s Powers

There are four constitutional texts that could provide a basis for
congressional legislation that would choose between “hard” and “soft”
pluralism.
The grant of congressional power most closely allied to
determining the scope of states’ regulatory authority is the “Effects Clause” of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The first clause of that provision states that
“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts . . . of
every other State,” and the so-called “Effects” clause provides that “Congress
may by general Laws prescribe . . . the Effect” of such “Acts.”153 The term
“public Acts” long has been understood to encompass state legislation,154 and
so the Full Faith and Credit Clause grants Congress the power to determine
what effect one state’s legislation is to have in another state. Applied to our
hypothetical, the Effects Clause gives Congress the power to determine
whether Utah law would have effect vis-B-vis Mary while she was in
California.
This use of the Effects Clause is consistent with the way scholars long
have understood it. There have been longstanding scholarly calls for Congress
to enact legislation that would provide federal choice-of-law rules to replace
the hodgepodge of state choice-of-law rules that currently are relied upon to

152. See generally Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115
YALE L.J. 1346 (2006) (criticizing judicial review of legislation).
153. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §1.
154. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232 (1998).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2007]

“HARD” OR “SOFT” PLURALISM?

753

resolve virtually all choice-of-law questions.155 Whether Mary is subject to
Utah or California abortion law when she is in California can be usefully
understood as a conflict-of-laws question. More generally, determining the
scope of states’ extraterritorial regulatory powers is an aspect of the conflictof-laws that falls to Congress via the Effects Clause, either on its own or by
virtue of the Effects Clause in conjunction with the Sweeping Clause.
Further, there is little question that, under the contemporary case law that
defines the scope of the Effects Clause, Congress has the power to enact the
type of legislation at issue here. The Court has observed that the Effects
Clause gives Congress the power to enact rules regarding the requirements of
full faith and credit that vary from those that the Court has identified.156
Though there is some uncertainty in the case law whether this embraces
congressional power to determine that a public act or judgment is to be given
less effect than what the Court has determined,157 the Court has stated
explicitly that Congress has the power to give greater effect to a state law than
the Court has held to be required by the Full Faith and Credit Clause.158
The type of legislation under consideration here would best be
characterized as either confirming what Full Faith and Credit case law already
permits (if Congress opted for “soft” pluralism) or as increasing the full faith
and credit that otherwise is permitted by contemporary jurisprudence (if
Congress opted for “hard” pluralism) and, for these reasons, unquestionably
could be enacted under Congress’s Effects Clause powers.159 To understand
the relationship between the legislation under consideration here and the
Court’s Full Faith and Credit jurisprudence, it first is necessary to understand
the general contours of Full Faith and Credit case law. While early Supreme
Court case law interpreting the Full Faith and Credit Clause required State A to

155. See, e.g., William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1,
42 (1963); Walter Wheeler Cook, The Powers of Congress Under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, 28 YALE L.J. 421, 432–33 (1919); Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp:
The Case for Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1 (1991).
156. See Rosen, supra note 12, at 965–66.
157. See id. at 967. Though I have strongly critiqued this “one-way” ratchet approach to
congressional power under the Effects Clause, see id. at 954–57, the persuasiveness of my
argument is not relevant here because Congress would have the power to enact the legislation
under consideration even under the “one-way” ratchet approach for the reasons discussed above
in text.
158. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 729 (1988). I discuss this case fully in
Rosen, supra note 12, at 965–66.
159. Let me stave off potential confusion: that contemporary doctrines examined in Parts I
and II (Due Process, Dormant Commerce Clause, right to travel, Privileges and Immunities,
Privileges or Immunities) give rise to a regime of “hard” pluralism is not inconsistent with the
fact that a different constitutional doctrine—that of Full Faith and Credit—does not require that
California apply Utah law in its courts.
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apply the law of State B if State B had a superior interest in the matter,160
modern cases have loosened this understanding of full faith and credit and now
permit State A to apply its law so long as State A has sufficient contacts such
that applying its law would not violate due process.161 In short, early case law
adopted a “multilateralist” approach under which full faith and credit
determinations were based on a comparison of the competing states’ interests
in regulating a particular matter, whereas contemporary law has adopted a
“unilateralist” approach that only considers whether the state seeking to apply
its law has at least a minimum quantum of contacts.162 Today’s unilateralist
approach hence is a less strict approach to what full faith and credit requires
than was the “multilateralist” approach of yesteryear’s jurisprudence.
Accordingly, regardless of whether Congress adopted legislation that reflected
a choice of “soft” or “hard” pluralism, any such legislation would fall under
Congress’s Effects Clause powers: legislation indicating that Utah did not have
extraterritorial regulatory authority would be consistent with contemporary
Full Faith and Credit doctrine, and legislation determining that Utah did have
the power to extraterritorially regulate Mary would increase the full faith and
credit that California would be required to give to Utah law and thereby also
would uncontroversially fall within Congress’s Effects Clause powers.163
There is a second constitutional text on which Congress could rely to
determine the scope of states’ extraterritorial regulatory powers that is less
obvious than the Effects Clause but is, in my view, equally sound as a
conceptual matter. As discussed above, the extent of state extraterritorial
powers is one of the determinants of what it means to be a citizen of the United
States in respect of our country’s federal union. As such, a strong argument
can be made that Congress has power under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment to “enforce by appropriate legislation”164 Section One’s guarantee
that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges of immunities of citizens of the United States” by defining what is
entailed by “citizen[ship] of the United States” and its “privileges and
immunities.”165

160. See Rosen, supra note 3, at 961–62 (discussing Bradford Elec. Light Co., Inc. v.
Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932) and several other cases).
161. See Rosen, supra note 12, at 933 & n.60.
162. See William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument
for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 101, 107–110 (1998) (providing a useful
discussion of unilateralism and multilateralism).
163. Institutional reasons can explain why courts were unsuited to making multilateralist
determinations but that Congress is well-suited to making such determinations. See Rosen, supra
note 99, at 817–23.
164. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §5.
165. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
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As sensible as this may seem, the contemporary jurisprudence inaugurated
by City of Boerne v. Flores166 casts doubt on (though does not definitively
decide the question of) congressional power to determine the scope of state
extraterritorial powers pursuant to Section Five. This is so because Boerne
limits Congress’s Section Five powers to providing “congruent and
proportional” steps to remedy or prevent state violations of Sections One
through Four of the Fourteenth Amendment as it specifically denies Congress
the power to define the scope of the substantive protections afforded in
Sections One through Four.167
On the other hand, there is no basis in the case law for concluding that
Boerne’s constraints apply to substantive provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment that the Court expressly has not expounded in full, such as the
Privileges or Immunities Clause.168 Indeed, many of the concerns animating
the Boerne Court would be absent in this context. The Boerne Court was quite
clearly incensed that Congress sought to effectively undo the Court’s
constitutional ruling in the Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith169 case, and legislation that expanded on what
the Court acknowledged to be only an incomplete list of national privileges or
immunities would not be a “dis” to the Court in the way that the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act was (and in fact may not be disrespectful to the Court
in any respect whatsoever).170 The Boerne Court also was concerned by the
“substantial costs RFRA exacts, both in practical terms of imposing a heavy
litigation burden on the States and in terms of curtailing their traditional
general regulatory power . . . .”171 Such concerns are present when Congress
relies on Section Five to readjust “vertical” federalism’s boundaries between
federal and state regulatory authority, but they are not raised by legislation
directed at the “horizontal” federalism issue of determining the scope of states’
extraterritorial regulatory authorities in relation to one another.
Notwithstanding these very real differences between the type of legislation that
post-Boerne jurisprudence has struck down and the legislation contemplated
here, one could not be certain that the Court would uphold congressional
power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine the
scope of states’ extraterritorial powers.
Another possible source of congressional power to decide between “hard”
and “soft” pluralism is Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause.
Although the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not contain an explicit

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

521 U.S. 507 (1997).
See id. at 519–20.
See supra Part II.B.1.
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519–20.
Id. at 534.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

756

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 51:713

grant of congressional power, and though other provisions in Article IV do,
Professor Gillian Metzger has provided a powerful argument that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause nonetheless should be understood as
granting Congress legislative powers.172 If the Clause indeed were a source of
congressional power, the Privileges and Immunities Clause could be an
additional source for Congress’s power to enact the legislation under
contemplation here. This is so because the Privileges and Immunities Clause
addresses the way that visitors are to be treated when they are in sister states,
and there is obvious overlap between the status of visitors and a home state’s
extraterritorial regulatory powers in relation to its traveling citizens.
The final constitutional provision Congress could rely upon to enact
legislation concerning the scope of states’ extraterritorial regulatory powers is
the all-purpose Commerce Clause, even after Lopez and its progeny. In terms
of the hypothetical immediately under consideration, Congress undoubtedly
could decide that Mary either could or could not obtain an abortion in
California insofar as abortion “substantially affects interstate commerce.”173
While there certainly is a distinguished legacy of legislation enacted under
the Commerce Clause that sought to accomplish policy objectives more
conceptually tied to other constitutional grants of congressional power,174 there
are strong reasons to believe that it would be preferable for Congress to utilize
the constitutional provisions most conceptually suited to accomplishing the
particular task at hand. First, relying on the most conceptually appropriate
constitutional provision may help maintain congressional clarity as to what the
legislation is attempting to do (in this case, determining the scope of states’
regulatory authority and thereby deciding the nature of national citizenship in
our federal union, just not regulating interstate commerce). Second, relying on
less apt constitutional provisions may interfere with maximal accomplishment
of Congress’s policy goals; for instance, relying on the Commerce Clause
eliminates congressional power to address states’ extraterritorial regulatory
powers in relation to matters that do not have a substantial connection to
interstate commerce.175 Third, to the extent there are constitutional limits that
appropriately apply to Congress’s exercise of its power in relation to regulating
states’ extraterritorial powers, it is better to create such doctrinal limitations in

172. See Metzger, supra note 10, at 1485–88.
173. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995).
174. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding civil
rights legislation as a constitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power despite the
fact that Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment would have been the more conceptually
appropriate basis for enacting civil rights legislation).
175. So, for example, the civil rights legislation at issue in Heart of Atlanta applied only to
those private businesses large enough to satisfy the Commerce Clause’s requirements. Id. at 247.
Had the legislation rested solely on Congress’s Section Five power, there would have been no
need to have such a size limitation.
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the context of the specific constitutional doctrines that give rise to the
congressional power rather than engraft such limitations onto general
Commerce Clause doctrine, where the limitations may have unanticipated
going-forward consequences when Congress seeks to regulate in very different
contexts.
Finally, it is worth noting that the conclusion that the Constitution gives
Congress (and the President) primary responsibility for determining the scope
of states’ extraterritorial powers does not mean that courts play no role. Even
absent any legislation whatsoever, it is perfectly appropriate for federal
courts176 to decide whether a state has appropriately regulated extraterritorially
under the doctrinal rubric of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Fourteenth
Amendment’s national Citizenship Clause and Privileges or Immunities
Clause, or the right to travel. Recognition that Congress plays the primary role
in answering such questions means, however, that any judicial answers that
precede legislation should not be viewed as limiting Congress if and when it
elects to act. Rather, any such judicial answers have the same status as the
doctrine known as “Dormant Commerce Clause” that courts have developed
when states regulate in respect of matters that Congress has the power to
regulate under the Commerce Clause but has not (yet) regulated. It is
undisputed that if and when Congress exercises its Commerce Clause powers
that had been dormant, it is not bound by the Court’s Dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine; Congress may go so far as to authorize states to regulate in
ways that the Court had held to be impermissible under its Dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence.177 As I have argued elsewhere, the Dormant Commerce
Clause is best conceptualized as a species of federal common law.178 Case law
concerning the scope of states’ extraterritorial regulatory powers decided
before Congress enacts legislation on the subject likewise should be deemed to
be merely provisional federal common law that in no way diminishes
Congress’s powers if and when it should choose to exercise them.179
176. Professor Bellia has made the interesting point that state courts typically have the power
to make federal common law. See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., State Courts and the Making of Federal
Common Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 825, 839–51 (2005) (showing state courts’ role in the
formulation of federal common law). This might be unwelcome news in light of the analysis
above giving rise to the conclusion that the federal government is better suited than states to
deciding the questions of national identity that are raised by the issues discussed in this Article.
177. See Rosen, supra note 12, at 972–73.
178. Rosen, supra note 11.
179. Congress certainly may look to such case law for guidance when it makes its political
decisions, though in so doing it must be careful to distinguish between (1) judicial doctrine that
on a case-by-case, inductive basis has identified the principles and counter-principles that
appropriately inform the ultimately normative decision that balances such competing
considerations and (2) judicial doctrine that reflects appropriate judicial reluctance to resolve the
substantive normative question on account of courts’ institutional limitations. As I have argued
elsewhere, the Full Faith and Credit jurisprudence that has rejected multilateralism and adopted
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CONCLUSION
Were Roe v. Wade to be overruled, Utah would have the power under
contemporary constitutional jurisprudence to prohibit its citizen Mary from
obtaining an abortion in California. This assessment is based on two subconclusions: that (1) states have extensive powers to regulate their own
citizens’ out-of-state activities (under the Tenth Amendment and due process,
and not disturbed by observations in recent Dormant Commerce Clause case
law) and that (2) assorted constitutional side-constraints on state extraterritorial
power, as presently construed by the Supreme Court, would not bar this
particular Utah regulation (the right to travel, Article IV’s Privileges and
Immunities Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause and
Privileges or Immunities Clause).
While the existence of baseline state extraterritorial powers is both
longstanding and wise and therefore unlikely to change, the jurisprudence
concerning the side-constraints does not enjoy the same presumptive stability.
Normative considerations invariably will influence the side-constraints’
ultimate doctrinal contours, and whether Utah should have the power to
regulate Mary’s California activity implicates very deep questions concerning
the nature of national citizenship in our federal union. At issue ultimately is
whether our country has a regime of “hard” or “soft” pluralism in respect of
those policies that federal law does not require national uniformity, and the
choice between the two has implications far beyond our unlikely hypothetical
concerning Mary. This is so because a home state’s power to apply its laws to
its traveling citizens is relevant to a wide range of legitimate state laws whose
policies can be effectively gutted if citizens can avail themselves of another
state’s less restrictive laws by simply crossing a border.
Although states largely have the power to decide for themselves whether to
regulate their citizens’ extraterritorial activities at present, Congress has the
power to effectively overrule state decisions in this regard and select either a
regime of “hard” or “soft” pluralism via its powers under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, and perhaps Article
IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause.
This allocation of ultimate
decisionmaking power is sensible. Determining the scope of states’ regulatory
authority and deciding between “soft” and “hard” pluralism are functions that
properly fall to the federal government, rather than to the states, because how
these issues are resolved are important determinants of the character of

unilateralism by folding Full Faith and Credit analysis into the Due Process doctrine is best
understood as doctrine that reflects lack of judicial competence in undertaking the complex
balancing of incommensurable considerations that invariably is involved in determining which
state has a greater interest in having its law applied in a given circumstance. See Rosen, supra
note 12, at 978 & n.236. Legislatures, by contrast, are institutionally expected in our democratic
system to render these sorts of highly subjective, political judgments.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2007]

“HARD” OR “SOFT” PLURALISM?

759

national citizenship in respect of our federal union. Moreover, these
determinations fall more appropriately to the Congress (with presidential
participation via the Presentment Clause) than to federal courts because the
choice between “soft” and “hard” pluralism—a very hard choice indeed—will
be driven by highly subjective judgments that are essentially political in
character.
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